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The caseload of American appellate courts, state and federal, has grown
astonishingly in recent years. Not only has the number of cases presented for
resolution grown dramatically, but their complexity also has increased. The increases
in case volume and difficulty have placed great pressure on the judiciary. Appellate
judges have sought to reduce that pressure in a number of ways, one of the most
common being to reduce the number of opinions that they publish. Doing so, it is
believed, saves judges much valuable time because unpublished opinions require less
judicial effort to prepare. 2 A reduction in the number of published opinions also
makes it easier for attorneys to research and learn the law and reduces the cost of
acquiring and storing necessary legal materials.3 Those benefits have led many
appellate courts to decide that not all opinions should be published. Instead, those
courts have decided that only opinions that are "law-making" need be made generally
available; opinions that "merely" decide cases without adding to the corpus juris
safely can be left unreported.
Publication, however, cannot be limited without incurring substantial costs.4 An
unpublished opinion is virtually invisible to public scrutiny; hence, the decision not
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1. In the United States courts of appeals for example, filings increased from 5771 in 1965 to 29,630 in 1983-
an increase of about 500%. In the Ohio courts of appeals the increase has been 360% from 1965 to 1982 (2469 to 8963).
See DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF TIlE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1983); OHIO COURTS
SUMMARY 13 (1982); OHto COURTS SUMMARY 3 (1965).
2. The proposition that reducing the number of published opinions will enhance judicial productivity seems
intuitively obvious; moreover, it can claim support from prestigious authority. See, e.g., COMMItSSION ON REVISION OF THE
FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 50 (1975).
Nevertheless, the correlation never has been empirically verified. Reynolds & Riehman, An Evaluation of Limited
Publication in the United States Court of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 595-98 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as The Price of Reform); see also Reynolds & Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited
Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 CoLuMi. L. REV. 1167, 1183 n.95 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Non-Precedetial Precedent].
3. The argument that limited publication saves judges time in the preparation of opinions is directed toward the
cost of production of published opinions. The second argument--that limited publication saves courts and lawyers time
in their case research is directed more toward the cost of consuming published opinions. See generally Non-Precedential
Precedent, supra note 2, at 1181-89. Interestingly, practicing lawyers to whom we speak about unpublished opinions do
not seem grateful for the time saved in research. They usually distrust limited publication out of fear that the court may
rely on some authority unavailable to them.
4. These arguments, which are summarized in the text, are discussed in detail in id. at 1189-1204.
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to publish makes judges less accountable for their decision-making. Decreased
accountability in turn leads to both the perception and the possibility of inconsistent,
arbitrary, and even biased decisions. Moreover, failure to publish means the decisions
are not available to inform the bar of the manner in which the law is developing. The
development of "hidden" precedents mocks the concept of stare decisis and presents
the distinct possibility of inconsistent decision-making. Further, there is concern that
hidden precedents will be known to some members of the bar, but not to others; those
who possess such additional knowledge have an unfair advantage over those who do
not. 5
The arguments in favor of limited publication and concern over its impact led,
in the 1970s, to the adoption of formal publication plans by many appellate courts.
The notion was that such plans would provide judges some guidance in making the
publication decision. These plans vary widely in scope and detail; typically, however,
they address such topics as who decides whether an opinion is published, what
standards control the decision, and what is the precedential value of unpublished
opinions.
Publication of Ohio appellate decisions was not governed by formal guidelines
until the adoption in 1982 of the Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions. 6
The new rules provide those guidelines, but they also create significant problems.
This Article evaluates those rules and suggests several changes that will help the court
achieve the desired administrative efficiencies with fewer sacrifices of the traditional
values of appellate justice.
II. THE OHIO COURT STRUCTURE
The Ohio judicial system is based on the familiar three-tier model found in most
populous states: trial courts of general jurisdiction, intermediate appellate courts (the
courts of appeals), and a court of last resort (the supreme court). 7 The Ohio
Constitution largely defines the jurisdiction of the supreme court: It has original
jurisdiction in some limited matters, such as applications for high peremptory writs,8
and matters relating to admission to bar and attorney discipline. 9 A right of appeal to
the supreme court exists in a small class of cases, 10 and the court also has mandatory
jurisdiction when a court of appeals certifies a judgment to be in conflict with another
court of appeals' judgment on the same question. II In all other cases, the supreme
5. One method of dealing with this problem has been to forbid the citation of unpublished opinions or to deprive
them of precedential value. Some courts (including several United States circuit courts) have chosen this option. See D.C.
CIR. R. 8(0, lsr CIR. R. 14, 7TH CR. R. 35(b)(iv), 8TH Cm. R. 8(i), 9TH CIR. R. 21(c). The issue is treated in greater
detail at infra, section V(B)(3).
6. The Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions are found at 3 Ohio St. 3d xxi (1983). as well as in
the appropriate volumes of both Page's and Baldwin's Ohio Revised Code [hereinafter cited as Sup. Cr. R. REP. Os.].
The Rules also are reprinted infra, at app. A.
7. See Otto CONsT. art. IV, § I.
8. Id. art. IV, § 2(B)(l)(a)-(e).
9. Id. art. IV, § 2(B)(I)(g).
10. Id. art. IV, § 2(B)(2)(a). The legislature has also provided for direct appeal from certain administrative
agencies. E.g., Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 4903.12 (Page 1977); see Ot1to CON sT. art. IV, § 2(B)(2)(c).
11. OHIO CONSr. art. IV, § 2(B)(2)(e); see id. art. IV, § 3(B)(4).
[Vol. 46:313
RULES FOR THE REPORTING OF OPINIONS
court's jurisdiction is discretionary. 12
Ohio is divided geographically into twelve appellate districts, each of which has
between three and nine judges. ' 3 These courts handle the vast bulk of Ohio's appellate
caseload. Litigants before all Ohio trial courts and many agencies have a right of
appeal. "4 Further, almost all appeals must go through the court of appeals. As a result
of the mandatory appellate jurisdiction of the courts of appeals and the largely
discretionary nature of the supreme court's jurisdiction, about ninety-seven percent of
all appellate terminations occur in the courts of appeals.' 5 Thus, these intermediate
courts often are in practice the real courts of last resort in Ohio.' 6
Two other provisions of Ohio law serve to exacerbate the workload of the court
of appeals. Three judges must hear all cases, 17 and the court must deal with every
assignment of error and state in writing the reasons for its decision on each issue. ' 8
III. HISTORY OF THE RULES
Regulation of the reporting of courts of appeals opinions in Ohio began with the
constitutional revision of 1912.19 At that time, article IV, section 6 of the Ohio
Constitution was amended to require publication of all supreme court opinions. It also
provided that "laws may be passed providing for the reporting of cases in the courts
of appeals."- 20 In 1919, the Ohio General Assembly passed such a law in response to
complaints from the bar about the proliferation of unofficial reports and the expense
required to maintain a relatively complete library. 2' Later codified as Ohio Revised
Code section 2503.20, that statute22 provided:
12. Id. art. IV, § 2(d).
13. OHIo COURTS SUMMARY 11 (1982).
14. OtHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.03 (Page 1981); id. § 119.12; see Comment, Administrative Adjudications: An
Overview of the Existing Models and Their Failure to Achieve Uniformity and a Proposal for a Uniforn Adjudicatory
Framework, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 355, 361-62 (1985). The courts of appeals also have original jurisdiction in a small group
of cases. See Onto CONST. art. IV, § 3(B)(1).
15. In 1982, 8,804 cases were terminated in the courts of appeals. The supreme court terminated 266 appeals. Onto
CoURTs SUMMARY 6 (1982) (This figure is the total terminations from the "Merit Docket," less cases of original
jurisdiction.).
16. Because Ohio has no stare decisis among the several district courts of appeals, compare State v. Karnett, 30
Ohio App. 2d 77, 283 N.E.2d 636 (1972). rev'd on other grounds, 34 Ohio St. 2d 193, 297 N.E.2d 537 (1973); with
Securities, Inc. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 94 Ohio App. 323, 115 N.E.2d 9 (1953), each district has great
control over the development of case law in its territory.
17. OHto CoNr. art. IV, § 3(A).
18. OHIo R. APP. P. 12(A).
19. Shaw, The Legal Significance of the Unpublished Court of Appeals Opinion in Ohio, 6 CAP. U.L. REv. 393
(1977).
20. The Modern Courts Amendment of 1968 moved these provisions. Ohio Const. art. IV, § 2(c) now contains the
requirement for publication of supreme court opinions; the provision permitting laws regulating publication of courts of
appeals opinions is now Ohio Const. art. IV, § 3(c).
21. There had been an earlier attempt to remedy the problem of unofficial reporting. On September 21. 1915, Rule
XII of the Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals of Ohio was amended to include language substantially identical to
that of the statute. That amendment did not substantially reduce the problem of unofficial reporting. These developments
are reported more fully in Shaw, supra note 19, at 393; Note, The Unofficially Reported Case as Authoriy, 10to ST.
L.J. 135 (1935).
22. OHIo GEN. CODE § 1483 (Page 1951). The current provisions of the Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of
Opinions contradict the statute in several significant respects. Whether the Rules authoritatively supersede the statute is
discussed at infra section IV.
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[The Supreme Court Reporter] shall prepare for publication and edit, tabulate, and index
those opinions and decisions of any court of appeals furnished him for publication by any
such court....
No cases in the court of appeals shall be reported for publication except those selected
by the several courts of appeals, or by a majority of the judges thereof.
Opinions for permanent publication in book form shall be furnished to the reporter and to
no other person. [AII such cases must be reported in accordance with this section before
they shall be recognized by and receive the official sanction of any court.
The statute appears to give courts of appeals judges complete control over the
publication of their opinions. The first quoted portion seems to require the Supreme
Court Reporter to publish all opinions furnished by those judges, and the second
quoted section gives the judges a veto power over any publication decisions.'Finally,
the third quoted section appears to withdraw precedential effect from all opinions
except those officially reported.
Appearances can be deceiving, however, and the practice under the statute was
to disregard at least two of its key provisions. The Supreme Court Reporter did not,
in fact, publish all opinions furnished by the courts of appeals. 23 In fact only a small
percentage of the total number of opinions was published.2 4 Similarly, the statute's
"no official sanction" provision, which appears to withdraw precedential effect from
unpublished opinions, often was disregarded. 25 The results of these interpretations
were most unsatisfactory. By 1979, only one court of appeals opinion in thirty-five
was published.2 6 Further, the precedential effect of an unreported opinion was
anything but clear.
23. Black, Hide and Seek Precedent: Phantom Opinions in Ohio, 50 U. CmN. L. REV. 477, 481 (1981).
24. The numbers of published and unpublished opinions from the Ohio courts of appeals in the last seven years are
shown in the table.
Total Terminations Opinions
Terminations by Opinion Published
Year Number Number % Number %
1976 6,315 4,054 64.20% 195 4.81%
1977 7,929 5,337 67.31% 218 4.08%
1978 7,366 5,047 68.50% 181 3.59%
1979 7,876 5,536 70.29% 157 2.84%
1980 8,589 5,813 67.68% 130 2.23%
1981 9,424 6,441 68.41% 274 4.25%
1982 8,804 5,940 67.46% 244 4.10%
The figures in the first three columns are taken from Ohio Courts Summary, published by the Administrative Director
of the Supreme Court of Ohio. The number of published opinions was determined by actual count for the years 1981 and
1982 of cases reported in 65 Ohio Op. 2d through 10 Ohio Op. 3d. For the years 1976 to 1980. the number of published
opinions is that reported by Judge Black in Black, Unveiling Ohio's Hidden Court, 16 AKRON L. REV. 107 (1982).
25. At least two courts held the apparently mandatory non-citation provisions of § 2503.20 to be merely directory.
See Gutin v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 154 F.2d 961 (1946); State v. George, 50 Ohio App. 2d 297, 362 N.E.2d 1223
(1975). Further, the supreme court and three district courts of appeals permitted citation of unreported cases. See Oto
Sup. CT. R. PRAC. V. § I(E); Otuo Isr DisT. CT. App. R. 6(D)(2); Onio 8Th DiSr. CT. App. R. 19; Ono 12i DiST. Cr.
App. R. 6(F). Each rule conditions citation upon appending a copy of the unreported decision to the brief. Ohio law reviews
and treatises also cite unreported opinions. See, e.g., Black. supra note 23, at 483 n.34.
26. See supra note 24.
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Efforts to reform this system began with the judges of the courts of appeals. In
September of 1981,27 Judge Robert Black delivered a speech to the Ohio Court of
Appeals Judges Association drawing attention to the deficiencies of Ohio's system for
reporting courts of appeals opinions. Drawing on the national literature on the topic, 28
Judge Black emphasized the serious costs of limited publication: erosion of the
doctrine of stare decisis, decrease in judicial responsibility and accountability,
inconsistencies between the published and unpublished law, and the division of the
bar into two groups, one with access to the unpublished law and the other without.
Further, Judge Black argued that the situation in Ohio was worse than in many other
judicial systems because such a small fraction of the opinions of the courts of appeals
were published. Three percent of those opinions were published, as opposed, for
example, to the thirty-eight percent figure for the United States circuit courts of
appeals. 29 Shortly after Judge Black's speech, the Ohio Court of Appeals Judges
Association formed a committee to study the problem. This committee developed a
new plan for the publication of courts of appeals opinions in the form of a proposed
addition to the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.30 Roughly contemporaneous with
these developments, Judge Black, in two thoughtful law review articles, 3' reiterated
the deficiencies in the Ohio system and made detailed proposals for reform including
the adoption of the committee's proposed rule of appellate procedure. 32
Perhaps in response to these criticisms, the Supreme Court of Ohio, during the
1982 summer recess, drafted a new plan for the publication of supreme court and
court of appeals opinions. 33 Later, on September 24, 1982, the supreme court
appointed an advisory committee of distinguished judges and lawyers 34 to advise the
court on the content of the draft rule. The committee acted expeditiously; by
November of 1982 it had forwarded its report to the supreme court.35 That report
identified several key problems with the supreme court's drafted rule and recom-
27. Preliminary efforts to deal with the problem actually commenced in 1979. The Conference of Appellate Courts
resolved to appoint a committee to review opinion reporting practices in Ohio and make recommendations for reform. The
committee consisted of one judge from each appellate district and was chaired by Judge Robert E. Holmes (at the time
a judge on the tenth district court of appeals). After six months of work, the committee, assisted by Professor Ronald R.
Solove of Capital University Law School, prepared a report, which described the problem of opinion reporting in Ohio
but recommended no solution; instead the report called for further study. The resolution of the Conference of Appellate
Courts and the report authored by Professor Solove are unpublished; the relevant portions, however, are on file in the
offices of the Ohio State Law Journal.
28. Judge Black relied heavily on the literature discussing the problem in the United States circuit courts of appeals.
See The Non-Precedential Precedent, supra note 2; The Price of Reform, supra note 2.
29. See The Price of Reform, supra note 2, at 587.
30. Rule 25 appears infra app. B.
31. Black, supra note 23; Black, supra note 24.
32. Black, supra note 24, at 112-14.
33. The draft entitled Supreme Court Rules for the Publication of Opinions [herinafter cited as Draft Rules] appears
infra app. C.
34. Letter from Frank D. Celebrezze, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Ohio, to members of the committee: Judge
Robert L. Black, Jr., Chairman (Cincinnati); Judge Jack G. Day (Cleveland); Judge James A. Brogan (Dayton); Judge
Earl E. Stephenson (Portsmouth); Judge Joseph Donofrio (Youngstown); Judge Robert H. Gorman (Cincinnati); Judge Ira
G. Turpin (Canton); Judge Alice Resnick (Toledo); Judge Frank G. O'Bell (Cleveland); Eli Manos, Esq. (Cleveland); John
Pinney, Esq. (Cincinnati); Dean John W. Stoepler (Toledo); Douglas Wrightsel, Esq. (Columbus); Matthew Fitzsimmons,
Esq. (Columbus); John L. Mason, Esq. (Cincinnati); Coit Gilbert. Secretary (Columbus) (Sept. 24. 1982). [Hereinafter,
the committee is referred to as the Advisory Committee.]
35. The Advisory Committee's report appears infra app. D.
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mended solutions. The court, adopting some of the committee's recommendations
and rejecting others, promulgated final rules in February 1983 with an effective date
of March 1, 1983.36
IV. LEGAL STATUS OF THE SUPREME COURT RULES
It is not at all unusual for the legal status of an unreported opinion to be
ambiguous; indeed, that ambiguity is responsible for much of the interest in the
problem of opinion reporting.37 It is, however, very unusual for the legal status of the
opinion publication rules themselves to be ambiguous. Nevertheless, that is precisely
the situation in Ohio. The ambiguity arises from the simultaneous existence of two
seemingly binding, yet conflicting, authorities on opinion publication-the 1919
statutory plan codified in Ohio Revised Code section 2503.2038 and the Supreme
Court Rules for the Publication of Opinions promulgated in 1983.39 The conflict
between those two authorities is substantial, and embraces such central questions as
who should decide whether an opinion merits publication, what criteria should control
the decision, and what is the legal status of the unreported opinion. 40 The basic
question, of course, is whether the new Supreme Court Rules supersede the statute.
The conflict between legislatively and judicially promulgated rules that purport
to control the same activity can be resolved only by resort to organic lav, in this case,
the Ohio Constitution. As a result of the Modem Courts Amendment of 1968, article
IV, section 5 of the Ohio Constitution gives the supreme court several different types
of rulemaking authority. 41 Section 5(B) requires the court to prescribe rules of
"practice and procedure" in all Ohio courts. 42 Proposed rules must be filed by the
court with the clerks of each house of the General Assembly before January 15, and,
absent a concurrent resolution of disapproval from the General Assembly, the
proposed rules take effect on the following July 1. Further, rules promulgated in this
fashion supersede contrary statutory law; section 5(B) expressly provides: "All laws
36. The rules appear infra app. A.
37. The ambiguity, of course, inheres in the question of precedential value. See infra section V(B)(3). Many of the
arguments that support limited publication also support no citation rules, but common law courts seem uncomfortable with
the notion of ignorable decisions. This tension is revealed best by a statement from the testimony of Judge Robert Sprecher
of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit before the Hruska Commission: "I think all I am
speaking about is-I am talking about a non-precedential precedent, because I am talking about aids to future production
of opinions and not their use as precedents in the stare decisis sense." Hearings Before the Comm'n on Revision of the
Fed. Court Appellate Sys. 537 (2nd Phase 1974-1975).
38. Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 2503.20 (Page 1981).
39. Sup. CT. R. REP. Ops.
40. Thus, the statute is silent on criteria for publication, but the Rules list eight specific criteria. The statute
seemingly gives the publication decision to the judges on the panel, but the Rules repose most of that authority in the
Supreme Court Reporter. Also, the statute provides for non-recognition of unreported decisions, but the Rules have much
more complicated provisions. These features of the Rules are discussed in more detail at infra section V.
41. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5. The 1968 amendments are discussed in Milligan & Pohlman. The 1968 Modern
Courts Amendment to the Ohio Constitution, 29 OHIo St. L.J. 811 (1968). The rulemaking power of the Supreme Court
under the amendments is treated in Pamess & Manthey, Public Process and Ohio Supreme Court Rulemaking, 28 Ct.Ev.
ST. L. REV. 249 (1979), and Gianelli, The Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence: The General Assembly. Evidence, and
Rulemaking, 29 CASE W. REs. 16 (1978).
42. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(n). Procedural rules "pertain to the method of enforcing rights or obtaining redress."
Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 145, 285 N.E.2d 736, 744 (1972).
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in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have
taken effect." 43
Section 5(B) gives another type of rulemaking authority to the supreme court-
the power to make rules "governing the admission to the practice of law and
discipline of persons so admitted." Such rules of "government" differ from rules
of practice and procedure in two important respects. First, rules of government are not
submitted for legislative approval; second, no explicit provision permits rules of
government to supersede contrary statutory law. The second distinction, however, has
been eliminated by recent decisions of the supreme court holding that the court's
authority over the bar is plenary; thus, any statute inconsistent with a court-promul-
gated rule in that area must fail. 45
Article IV, section 5(A) vests yet a third species of rulemaking power in the
supreme court-the power to make rules for the "general superintendence" of all
Ohio courts. 46 Section 5(A) does not require legislative submission, and no clause
provides that a court rule supersedes conflicting statutes. The courts that have
addressed the question have found the absence of such provisions in section 5(A)
significant and have held, therefore, that rules of superintendence do not supersede
conflicting statutory law. Rather, such rules are invalid to the extent they conflict with
statutes .47
There are, in other words, several different kinds of supreme court rules and a
particular rule's power to supersede a statute depends upon the source of the supreme
court's authority to promulgate the rule. Thus, the conflict between the 1919 statute
and the new rules can be resolved only by examining the source of the court's power
to promulgate the rules. It seems quite clear that they are not rules of practice and
procedure under section 5(B). They do not regulate the parties' conduct in the
litigation process; moreover, they were not, as is required for rules of practice and
procedure, submitted for legislative approval. The publication rules also are not rules
for the government of the bar because they do not deal with admission to practice or
discipline. The most likely source for the power to promulgate the Supreme Court
Rules for the Reporting of Opinions, therefore, is section 5(A) of article IV. Because
section 5(A) rules of superintendence appear to have no statute-superseding power,
43. Id. The Supreme Court has held that rules promulgated pursuant to § 5(B) supersede contrary statutes only as
long as the rules are "procedural"; on matters of substance, statutes prevail. Boyer v. Boyer, 46 Ohio St. 2d 83, 346
N.E.2d 286 (1976).
44. Oto CoNsr. art. IV, § 5(B). That section also provides for yet another species of rulemaking power in the
supreme court, the authority to regulate the record keeping for all courts of the state.
45. See, e.g., South High Dev., Ltd. v. Weiner, Lippe & Cromley Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 1,445 N.E.2d 1106 (1983).
46. See State v. Smith, 47 Ohio App. 2d 317, 354 N.E.2d 699 (1976); State v. Lacy, 46 Ohio App. 2d 215, 348
N.E.2d 381 (1975).
47. Oto CONST. art. IV, § 5(A).
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a preliminary analysis indicates that the 1919 statutory publication plan is still the law;
insofar as the rules conflict with the statute, therefore, they are invalid.
There is, however, an argument to the contrary. Several courts48 and commen-
tators49 have contended that some kinds of rulemaking lie within the inherent and
exclusive power of the courts. The argument, relying on the doctrine of separation of
powers, suggests that there are "spheres of activity so fundamental and so necessary
to a court, so inherent in its very nature as a court, that to divest it of its absolute
command within these spheres is to make meaningless the very phrase judicial
power."50 Activities of this sort can be regulated by court rule even in the absence
of an explicit consitutional grant of rulemaking power; and, the argument continues,
such court-promulgated rules supersede conflicting enactments even in the absence of
an explicit statute-preempting clause in the Constitution.
Hypothetically assuming the validity of this argument, two important questions
remain: (1) Is opinion reporting and citation an area within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the judiciary? and (2) How well does the generic argument fit the specific
constitutional history of Ohio? It is difficult to produce a neat summary or formula
that accounts for the several categories of cases in which courts have held themselves
to possess exclusive power immune from legislative interference. 5' Fortunately for
present purposes it is sufficient to concentrate on a single category of cases-those in
which courts have invalidated statutes that purport to interfere with the details of
judicial administration.5 2 After surveying the cases, one thoughtful commentary
proposes the following tentative induction: "[W]hen the purpose of the rule is to
provide for the establishment and maintenance of the machinery essential for the
efficient administration of judicial business and it does only that, the scope of the
inherent power vested in the courts is complete and supreme." 53 On this standard, the
Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions produce an equivocal result.
Surely rules for the reporting of opinions, particularly in the face of financial pressure
48. Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 P. 575 (1931); Epstein v. State, 190 Ind. 693, 128 N.E. 353 (1920);
Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406 (1950).
49. The classic form of the argument appears in Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure are Void
Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REV. 276 (1928). More recent formulations can be found in Pamass, Correspondence: Public
Process and State-Court Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 1319 (1979); Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial
Rulemaking: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 170 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 29 (1958); Joiner & Miller. Rules of Practice
and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rulemaking, 55 Micri. L. REV. 623, 628 (1957). For cases that have used the argument,
see infra notes 51 & 52.
50. Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 49, at 30.
51. One preliminary problem with such a task is that the precedents involve interpretation of significantly different
constitutional clauses. Nevertheless, the eases can be grouped into tentative categories. Thus, courts have claimed plenary
power over the practice of law. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 426 A.2d 929 (1981); South High
Dev., Ltd., v. Weiner, Lippe & Cromley Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 1,445 N.E.2d 1106 (1983). They have held void statutes
that attempted to regulate the judges' time schedules, see, e.g., State ex rel. Kostas v. Johnson, 224 Ind. 540. 69 N.E.2d
592 (1946); Schario v. State, 105 Ohio St. 535, 138 N.E. 63 (1922), statutes that intruded too far into the actual business
of case adjudication, see, e.g., People v. Crawford Distrib. Co., 53 I11.2d 332, 291 N.E.2d 648 (1973); Gordon v. Lowry,
116 Neb. 359, 217 N.W. 610 (1928), and statutes that controlled judicial appointment of court support personnel. See.
e.g., State ex rel. Hovey v. Noble, 118 Ind. 350, 21 N.E. 244 (1889).
52. Thus, courts have invalidated statutes that stated requirements for an appellate brief, see Solomito v. State, 188
Ind. 170, 122 N.E. 578 (1919), compelled a court to write a syllabus to its opinion, see In re Griffiths, 118 Ind. 83. 20
N.E. 513 (1889), or compelled a court to write an opinion in every case. See Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24 (1859).
53. See Joiner & Miller, supra note 49 at 630.
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to reduce the number of published opinions, pass that test, but rules rationing
precedential value may transgress the "it does only that" clause. In other words, rules
purporting to withdraw precedential value arguably exceed a court's need to regulate
mechanics and may be seen as an attempt to regulate an area sufficiently controversial
to be subject to the political process through legislation. Perhaps an even stronger
argument is that nonprecedent rules turn the separation of powers argument upside
down; a common law court that is not bound by its own decisions has, in some sense,
ceased to act purely as a court and may be exercising power that is decidedly
nonjudicial. 54
The constitutional history of judicial rulemaking power in Ohio suggests an
additional difficulty with the inherent power/separation of powers argument. Hold-
ings and dicta (both in opinions and syllabi) in several early supreme court cases stand
for the proposition that Ohio courts have inherent rulemaking power but that even a
properly promulgated court rule must yield to a conflicting statute. 55 In 1967, the
supreme court complicated this relatively simple situation with its decision in Cassidy
v. Glossip.56 The actual holding in Cassidy, was that judicially and legislatively
promulgated jury waiver provisions did not conflict;57 dictum in the case, however,
caused confusion. The key passage stated that the legislature may not "infringe upon
the inherent power of the Common Pleas Court to establish reasonable rules regulating
its proceedings; ' 58 the implication of that passage is that a court rule supersedes a
conflicting statute on an issue within the court's inherent authority. The opinion
distinguished the earlier legislative supremacy cases by pointing out that their
justification lay in a repealed article of the Constitution.5 9 Astonishingly, however,
none of this judicial supremacy language is carried over into the syllabus of Cassidy;
rather, the syllabus simply reiterates the legislative supremacy proposition from the
earlier cases: "A common pleas court has inherent power to make reasonable rules
regulating the practice and procedure in such court where such rules do not conflict
with the Constitution or with any valid statute.' '60 The discrepancy between the
dictum in the opinion and the holding in the syllabus could not be more marked.
Whatever support the dictum in Cassidy lends to the inherent judicial supremacy
argument seems to be substantially weakened by the Modern Courts Amendment of
1968, which was adopted the year following the decision in Cassidy. As a result of
that amendment, Section 5(B) of Article IV now provides explicitly for certain court
rules (rules of practice and procedure) promulgated according to certain delineated
54. A court deciding cases that lack precedential effect separates its dispute-settling function from its law-making
function. See H. HART & A. SACKS. Ttm LEGAL PROCESS 662 (tent. ed. 1958). Thus, the court leaves behind a substantial
part of its essential and inherent judicial functions.
55. See Brown v. Mossop. 139 Ohio St. 24, 24, 37 N.E.2d 598, 599 (1941); Meyer v. Brinsky. 129 Ohio St. 371,
371, 195 N.E. 702, 703 (1935); Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Halliday, 127 Ohio St. 278, 278. 188 N.E. 1, 1 (1933); Van Ingen
v. Berger, 82 Ohio St. 255, 255, 92 N.E. 433, 433 (1910).
56. 12 Ohio St. 2d 17, 231 N.E.2d 64 (1967).
57. Id. at 22-25.
58. Id. at 22.
59. Id. at 21-22; see Ot1o CONST. art. XIV (General Assembly to appoint three commissioners to revise and
simplify practice and proceedings in Ohio courts) (repealed 1953).
60. Cassidy v. Glossip. 12 Ohio St. 2d 17, 18, 231 N.E.2d 64, 65 (1967) (emphasis added).
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procedures (legislative submission) to supersede contrary statute law. 6' Other court
rules are not (at least, not explicitly) given such privileged status. Thus, a strong
argument can be made that the drafters in 1968 made a conscious decision to divide
final rulemaking authority between the court and the legislature. 62
In summary, the legal status of the Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of
Opinions is unclear. They conflict in significant fashion with prior statutory law, 63
and a preliminary reading of the Ohio Constitution suggests that the rules cannot
supersede the statute. An argument for the contrary result can be made, but it faces
serious difficulties. A sensible solution to this confusion would be action by the
supreme court seeking repeal or amendment of section 2503.20. Then at least the
status, if not the merit, of the rules would be clear.64
V. ANALYSIS OF THE RULES
A. Reporting Supreme Court Opinions
Rule 1(A) of the Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions provides
that "all opinions of the Supreme Court shall be reported in the Ohio Official
Reports.''65 The rule merely restates what long has been the law in Ohio by
constitutional mandate. 66 Both the rule and the constitutional provision upon which
it is based make sense; because the supreme court's caseload is mostly discretionary,
the court should not be-and does not appear to be-overburdened. 67 Further, the
supreme court is not only the ultimate authority but also the only statewide authority
on questions of Ohio law; the need to report every supreme court opinion is
particularly acute in a state that has a number of independent appellate courts and no
inter-district stare decisis. 68
Rule 1(B) and (C)69 indicate that the "controlling point or points of law" of a
case are stated in the syllabus of an individually authored opinion and in the text of
61. OHto CoNsT. art. IV, § 5(B).
62. It is possible, of course, to read too much into legislative silence. There is also an impressive counterargument
to the point made in the text. Article IV, section 5(n) gives the supreme court power to regulate admission to the bar and
disqualification from practice but does tot explicitly insulate this rulemaking power from legislative interference.
Nevertheless, the supreme court has held since 1968 that its plenary power in this area is implicit and that its rules
supersede contrary enactments. South High Dev. Ltd. v. Weiner. Lippe & Cromley Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 1, 445 N.E.2d
1106 (1983). This seems to indicate that the supreme court believes that it has power to create statute-superseding rules
although that power is not explicitly granted in Article IV. If so. the supreme court's inherent power to issue
statute-superseding rules may have survived the Modem Courts Amendment of 1968.
63. See OHto REV. CODE ANN. § 2503.20 (Page 1981).
64. The Advisory Committee's solution was to repromulgate the Rules as rules of practice and procedure pursuant
to Article IV, § 5(B). See ADvIsORY CoMtmrrEE. REPORT AND RECOM,tiENDATtON I [hereinafter cited as ADVISORY CONtMtrrrEE
REPoRT].
65. Sup. CT. R. REP. OPs. I(A).
66. Otto CONST. art. IV, § 2(C).
67. In 1982, the court terminated 409 cases from the "Merit Docket." It also terminated 43 cases from the
-Disciplinary Docket" as well as over 1600 cases from the "'Motion Docket." The court appears to have little difficulty
in remaining current; terminations typically roughly equal filings. See Onto CouRTs SUMMstARY 6, 7 (1982).
68. Despite these arguments, in some states not all the opinions of the highest court are published. See. e.g., NEB.
REv. STAT. § 24-208 (1979); N.M. Sup. CT. Misc. R. 7.
69. Sup. Cr. R. REP. Op. I(B), (C).
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a per curiam opinion. 7o Once again the rules restate well-established principles of
Ohio law. The syllabus rule, dating back at least to 1858,71 provides that the signed
majority opinion in an Ohio Supreme Court case is simply the opinion of the
individual author; the entire court has approved only the syllabus, so it alone has the
controlling force of law. By contrast, the court has approved the entire text of a per
curiam opinion; thus, the entire text states the law. 72
Whatever the merits of Ohio's unusual syllabus rule, it does not apply to courts
of appeals opinions. Rule 2(F) states that "[t]he syllabus of a Court of Appeals
opinion shall not be considered the controlling statement of either the point or points
of law decided ... ;",73 rather it is simply a convenient researching and indexing
summary for the public and the bar. The text of the opinion provides the controlling
statement of the law. 74 The inconsistent treatment of supreme court and courts of
appeals opinions and syllabi has no obvious explanation in the different functions of
the two courts, and no explanation is given in the Ohio authorities. The distinction has
been justly criticized for opening the way "to a greater possibility of mistake and
confusion for both the practitioner and the Court in determining what is the law on
a particular point." 75 A more trenchant criticism is simply that the distinction appears
to be a rule without a reason; in an era in which courts and legislatures recognize that
rules of procedure and precedent must find justification in the precarious balance
between fairness and administrative efficiency, this inconsistency seems to be a
pointless complexity.
B. Reporting Court of Appeals Opinions
Controlled as it is by constitutional mandate, the supreme court's rule for the
reporting of its own opinions is straightforward enough. This is not true, however, of
70. The Draft Rules had used the term "law of the case" instead of "controlling point of law." The change was
recommended by the Advisory Committee. See ADVISORY Co,%trrrEE REPORT. supra note 64, at 3. The change was
fortunate because "law of the case" is a technical term dealing with the effect of earlier rulings on later proceedings in
a particular case. That is a limited portion of the more general question of the precedential effect of an opinion.
To the words "controlling point or points of law" the rules add the qualifier "necessarily arising from the facts
of the specific case before the Court for adjudication." The resulting definition of a case's precedential effect
is a very crabbed one. Normally, a court's reasoning-or justification-must be considered in determining an
opinion's precedential effect.
See W. REYNOLDS. JUDICIAL PROCESS IN A NtrsTIEIJ 77-85 (1980).
71. See Sup. CT. R. PRAC. VI (Reporter's Note). 94 Ohio St. ix (1917). At various points in its history, the syllabus
rule seems to have been adopted as a rule of court or simply as ease law. It also seems to draw some support from OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. § 2503.20 (Page 1981). A complete analysis of the syllabus practice is beyond the scope of this article.
See generally J. JACOBSTEIN & R. MERSKY, FUNDANIENTALS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 16 (4th ed. 1973); Fenneberg, The Rule
of the Syllabus in Ohio, 31 Oio BAR REP. 1105 (1958); Recent Cases: Rule of Court-Syllabus as the Law of the Case,
14 U. CIN. L. REV. 573 (1940) [hereinafter cited as Recent Cases].
72. See State v. Wilson. 58 Ohio St. 2d 52, 60, 388 N.E.2d 745, 751 (1979). Masheter v. Kebe, 49 Ohio St. 2d
148, 150, 359 N.E.2d 74, 76 (1976); Thackery v. Helfrich, 123 Ohio St. 334. 336. 175 N.E. 449, 450 (1931). The
syllabus rule has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court. See Ohio v. Gallagher, 425 U.S. 257, 259 (1976);
Beck v. State, 379 U.S. 89, 93 (1964); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 441-42 (1952).
73. Sup. Cr. R. REP. Ops. 2(F).
74. Once again, the rule simply restates the earlier law on the question. See Carruthers v. Kennedy, 121 Ohio St.
8, 16, 166 N.E. 801, 803 (1929); Parkview Hosp. v. Hospital Serv. Ass'n, 8 Ohio App. 2d 315, 222 N.E.2d 314 (1966);
Royal Indem. Co. v. McFadden, 65 Ohio App. 15, 29 N.E.2d 191 (1940).
75. See Recent Cases, supra note 71. at 576.
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Rule 2,76 which controls the reporting of decisions from the courts of appeals. The
provisions of Rule 2 concerning which opinions are reported and who makes the
reporting decision-the heart of any publication plan-are unusual, even bizarre, and
seem to denigrate the work of the courts of appeals. Moreover, Rule 2 is poorly
drafted, making a precise understanding of it difficult indeed.
1. Which Opinions Should be Published?
Among the most important questions a publication plan should address is what
guidelines should control the publication decision. In Ohio's system, as in most
others, guidelines come in two forms: standards that an opinion must meet if it is to
be published and a presumption either in favor of or against publication.
a. Standards
All publication plans provide some standards for determining which opinions
merit publication. Some are quite vague and amorphous; the plan of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, for instance, provides simply for the
publication of opinions that have "precedential or institutional value." '77 Other
courts, such as the Sixth Circuit, have adopted several specific and detailed criteria
that significantly limit the discretion of the decision maker. 78
In Rule 2, the Ohio Supreme Court adopted a confusing combination of the two
approaches. Rule 2(E) permits publication of an opinion if the court of appeals that
heard the case certifies that the opinion meets one or more of these standards:
(1) It establishes a new rule of law, which term as used in this rule includes common law,
statutory law, procedural rules and administrative rules;
(2) It alters, or modifies, or overrules an existing rule of law;
(3) It applies an established rule of law to facts significantly different from those in
previously published applications;
(4) It explains, criticizes, or reviews the history of an existing rule of law;
(5) It creates or resolves a conflict of authority, or it reverses, overrules, or otherwise
addresses a published opinion of a lower court or administrative agency;
(6) It concerns or discusses one or more factual or legal issues of significant public
interest;
(7) It concerns a significant legal issue and is accompanied by a concurring or dissenting
opinion;
(8) It concerns a significant legal issue upon the remand of a case from the United States
Supreme Court or the Supreme Court of Ohio. 79
These criteria are comprehensive, commendable, and easily understood. 80 In
drafting these standards the supreme court apparently has drawn heavily upon the
76. SuP. CT. R. REP. Ops. 2.
77. UNITED STAIS COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TIIIRD CIRCUIT, STAIEIENT OF THE INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES.
ch. 5(F)(1).
78. See 6rTt CIR. R. 24(a).
79. Sup. CT. R. REP. Ops 2(E).
80. Although most of the standards are comprehensible, rule 2(E)(1) gives some pause. It is not clear how a court
can create a "new rule of . . .statutory law .... " at least in a fashion consonant with the doctrine of separation of
powers. Presumably, this portion of the rule was designed to lead to publication of new interpretations of statutes.
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experience of other courts and the work of the commentators. 8' Although it is not
clear that the existence of specific, as opposed to vague, publication standards affects
the rate of opinion publication,82 it certainly is reasonable to assume that if the judges
have a checklist of specific standards to consult, they will make publication decisions
more wisely, and that fewer significant opinions will be overlooked.
Unfortunately, rule 2(E) also includes an additional and amorphous standard. To
warrant publication, an opinion not only must meet one of the specific criteria, but
also must satisfy the Supreme Court Reporter that it "contributes significantly to the
body of Ohio case law. ' '83 This extra requirement is puzzling, 84 for it is hard to
understand how an opinion that satisfied one of rule 2(E)'s eight criteria could
nonetheless fail to make a significant contribution to the law of Ohio.85 Further, the
additional requirement offers one more stumbling block to publication.
The real oddity in the structure of Rule 2 appears most forcefully, however, in
the provisions of rules 2(B) and 2(C).86 Rule 2(B) provides that no opinion shall be
published unless the Supreme Court Reporter approves it for reporting (presumably
guided by the "significant contribution" standard of rule 2(E)) and the majority of the
appellate panel certifies it as meeting one of the specific 2(E) standards. Rule 2(C),
however, permits the judges of a court of appeals to bypass the specific standards of
rule 2(E) by adopting a local rule that provides that each of its opinions will be sent
to the Supreme Court Reporter for a publication decision under the vague "significant
contribution" standard. There are, in other words, two possible paths to publication
for a court of appeals opinion. 87 On the one hand, if a court has a local rule providing
that each of its opinions will be forwarded to the Supreme Court Reporter, the opinion
must pass only one test, the Reporter's determination that it "contributes significantly
to the body of Ohio case law." If, on the other hand, a court has not adopted such
a rule, the opinion must satisfy the judges that it meets one of the specific standards
and satisfy the reporter under the "significant contribution" standard. Thus, while the
81. Particularly admirable are rules 2(E)(7) and (8), which call for publication of opinions that are accompanied
by a separate concurring or dissenting opinion and of opinions in cases that have been remanded from the United States
Supreme Court or the Supreme Court of Ohio. We recommended these provisions in a model rule in Tie Price of Reform,
supra note 2, at 627-28. Based upon the empirical study reported in that article we also suggested publication of opinions
that reverse the decision below unless: "a) the reversal is caused by an intervening change in law or fact, or b) the reversal
is a remand (without further comment) to the [trial court] of a case reversed or remanded by the Supreme Court ....
Id. at 627. Rule 2(E) does not include this provision, but the suggestion has been adopted by at least one court. See 6Tm
CIR. R. 24(a)(v).
82. See The Price of Reform, supra note 2, at 588-90 (no difference in publication rate for courts with specific as
opposed to vague standards).
83. Su. Cr. R. REP. Ors. 2(E). Of course, it is bizarre that the Reporter should be able to overrule the judges of
the panel on the question of publication. This problem is discussed fully in infra section V(B)(2).
84. The Advisory Committee found this extra publication standard to be a confusing execrescence. See ADVISORY
CosttrrtE REPORT, supra note 64, at 8. It might be argued that the "significant contribution" standard is simply shorthand
for the eight criteria of 2(E); on that view, the Supreme Court Reporter would be bound by the eight criteria.
85. An opinion that satisfied the eight-criteria test by interpreting federal law (or the law of another state) perhaps
could be said not to contribute to Ohio case law. Nevertheless, such opinions should be published.
86. Sup. Cr. R. REP. Ors. 2(B), (C).
87. Conversations with several courts of appeals judges reveal a third path, not provided for in the rules, but used
in practice. Some courts, even without benefit of a local rule, send all opinions to the Supreme Court Reporter for his
advice on which opinions should be reported. Typically, his recommendation is followed. The practice causes concern
because those judges seem to be abdicating an important part of their law-declaring function.
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specific standards of rule 2(E) are commendable, the combined effect of the "sig-
nificant contribution" test of rule 2(E) and the "bypass" provision of rule 2(C) is to
render the specific standards almost nugatory.
b. The Presumption
The grammatical form of rule 2(B)8 makes it clear that there is a presumption
against publication of courts of appeals' opinions. That presumption is regrettable.
Clearly, far too few of the courts of appeals' opinions were published before the
adoption of the rules,89 and the presumption in the rules very likely will perpetuate
a very low figure. That would be most unfortunate. With such a low publication rate,
it is certain that some valuable precedent is being suppressed. Further, a common law
court, the vast majority of whose decisions are non-precedential, begins to lose its
character as an Anglo-American judicial body; the rule of stare decisis becomes a
mockery if so small a portion of the court's work has precedential value. Finally, the
bar and the judges themselves may begin to lose respect for what has become a
"hidden court.''90 Because presumptions for and against publication do appear to
have an effect on the rate of publication, 9' an explicit presumption favoring publi-
cation of courts of appeals opinions would be a salutary addition to the Supreme Court
Rules for the Publication of Opinions.
2. Who Makes the Decision
By far, the least satisfactory feature of Rule 2 is its allocation of responsibility
for the publication decision. The difficulty is that the Rule does not repose complete
authority over the decision in the judges who have decided the case and written the
opinion. The appellate judges do have the power to veto publication of an opinion
because no opinion can be published unless they either certify that it meets one of the
eight publication standards of rule 2(E) or they have promulgated a local rule
providing that each of their opinions be sent to the reporter for publication. 92 The
court of appeals judges lack the power, however, to assure the publication of their
opinions. Two other actors have a veto over the publication decision.
Rule 2(A) gives the supreme court substantial power to limit publication of court
of appeals opinions. It provides that no opinion of the court of appeals shall be
officially reported:
(I) If the Supreme Court has the case pending for adjudication upon the merits or has ruled
upon the merits, unless the Supreme Court expressly orders such opinion to be reported,
(2) if the case is pending before the Supreme Court on a motion to certify the record or
88. Sup. CT. R. REP. Ops. 2(B) begins "No opinion of a Court of Appeals .. .shall be reported unless.
Id. (emphasis added).
89. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
90. The phrase is from Black, supra note 24, at 107.
91. See The Price of Reform, supra note 2, at 591.
92. Sup. CT. R. REP. Ops. 2(B), (C), (E).
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a motion for leave to appeal, or (3) unless a period of seventy days has expired from the
journalization of the judgment of the court of appeals. 93
The rule is pernicious because it permits the supreme court to suppress the
publication of an opinion with which it disagrees. 94 Certainly the supreme court must
be able to reverse a court of appeals decision or affirm it for reasons that differ from
those of the appellate panel. The supreme court should do so publicly, however, by
dealing with the merits of the court of appeals' arguments, not by consigning to legal
purgatory the heretical opinion. The supreme court's work is almost entirely insulated
from review; only a small portion can be second-guessed by the United States
Supreme Court or by the Ohio General Assembly. Thus lower court opinions often
serve as the only meaningful check on the supreme court's work. In its opinion, an
appellate panel can express skepticism about the trend of the supreme court's
decisions in a particular area, or the panel can point out confusion in the high court's
doctrine simply by attempting in good faith to apply it. Rule 2(A) provides the
supreme court the temptation and ability to suppress such salutary critiques; accord-
ingly, rule 2(A) should be eliminated.
Rules 2(B) and 2(E), which give the Supreme Court Reporter the power to veto
publication of a court of appeals opinion, are even more troublesome. Even if the
judges of the panel determine that the opinion meets one of the eight publication
standards of rule 2(E), the opinion cannot be officially reported unless the Supreme
Court Reporter determines that the opinion "contributes significantly to the body of
Ohio case law." 95 This is a bizarre rule. The Supreme Court Reporter is not a judge
but a bureaucrat, and no matter how responsible and dedicated he is,96 granting him
veto power over the decision to publish is a mistake of the first order. 97
93. Sup. CT. R. REP. Ors. 2(a).
94. The rule resembles the practice in California which permits the Supreme Court of California to "decertify"
publication of opinions of the California Courts of Appeals. See CAL. R. CT. 976. The practice has been severely criticized.
See generally Gerstein, "Law By Elimination:" Depublication in the California Supreme Court, 67 JUDICATURE 292
(1984).
95. Sup. CT. R. REP. Ors. 2(E). The rules provide no mechanism for appealing the Reporter's decision. Nor do they
provide a mechanism by which those outside the court can request publication of an opinion overlooked by the judges or
the Reporter. Several courts have adopted such rules. See 7m CR. R. 35(d)(3); 9-i CIR. R. 21(d); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
809.23(4) (West Supp. 1984). The argument for an "outside request" provision is that it decreases the likelihood that a
valuable precedential opinion will be permanently overlooked. The argument against such provisions is that they may tend
to skew the law in favor of habitual litigants. Such a litigant, say a local prosecutor or a state agency, will litigate a
particular issue again and again and will have a strong interest in assuring that any favorable disposition will have
precedential value. His opponent, only an occasional litigant on such issues, might have considerably less incentive to push
for publication of decisions favorable to him. The Advisory Committee recommended inclusion of an outside request
provision, but the supreme court rejected the suggestion. See ADVISORY CowtITrEE REPORT, supra note 64, at 6. The
current reporter had indicated that the actual practice of his office is to entertain outsiders' requests for publication. See
Kobalka, The Rules for Reporting Opinions, 58 LAw & FACT 7, 8 (1984).
96. Every indication is that the current Reporter, Walter S. Kobalka, is a dedicated and responsible public servant.
The court of appeals judges with whom we have spoken have not criticized his performance. Several judges indicate that
the current Reporter in practice will report any opinion the judges select unless reporting is specifically prohibited by the
rules. See, e.g., Sup. Cr. R. REP. Ors. 2(A). We understand that almost all opinions submitted to the Reporter are
published. Nevertheless, the possibility of censorship may deter the submission of publishable opinions. In any event, it
is thejudges--the decision-makers-who should make such an important decision, not a bureaucrat directly accountable
to no one.
97. We are aware of no other opinion publication plan that gives the Reporter such broad authority. Several plans,
however, do give the publication decision to a committee rather than to the panel that decided the case. See DEL. CODE
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Under the Ohio rules, the decision to publish is also the decision to create
precedent. 98 The decision to make law is one that must be made by the judges
themselves. There are several reasons why that is so. First, the judges are elected
officials,99 ultimately responsible to the people for their decisions. The Ohio Con-
stitution, by creating common law courts and judges, explicitly grants those judges
the power to decide cases'0 and implicitly grants them the power to make law (until
reversed or overruled by a higher court). The Supreme Court Reporter, by contrast,
is appointed and serves at the pleasure of the supreme court. '0' The Reporter has no
authority, constitutional or statutory, to make law in Ohio.
Second, no one knows the individual case better than the judges who decide it.
They are best able to determine if the case satisfies the criteria of rule 2(E) and, thus,
warrants publication. No matter how hard the Reporter works, he cannot study the
briefs, participate in oral argument, review the record, and read the applicable law in
each case. Yet those tasks are precisely the ones undertaken by the appellate panel in
every case. Thus, the Reporter's decision on publication cannot be as informed as the
decision of the panel.
Moreover, removing the publication decision from the judges also may remove
some incentive to write opinions that do make law. Rather, the judges simply may
decide to allow the courts of appeals to "become ad hoc adminstrative agencies
without any need to be consistent from case to case in the application or declaration
of the law of Ohio." 10 2
Finally, placing the courts of appeals under the Reporter's thumb must be
demoralizing. It is as if the supreme court does not believe the judges can be trusted,
and that a responsible third party, the Reporter, must supervise their most important
activities.
The Reporter's authority to "prepare, edit, [and] index" all officially reported
opinions compounds this problem. '0 3 The extent of this authority is not clear, but the
word "edit" seems to permit extensive reworking of the opinion. t04 Light editing to
pick up typographical errors or to correct citation form is perhaps harmless, but
nothing more than that should be permitted. Again, the Reporter does not know the
case as well as the judges who decided it; changes or deletions that may appear trivial
to the Reporter may assume major significance to those who know the problem better.
Further, rule 2(B) does not require the Reporter to submit his proposed changes to the
ANN. tit. 10 § 1961 (1974) (committee appointed by the chief justice of the Delaware Supreme Court); N.J.R, GEN.
APPLICATION 1:36-2 (committee appointed by chief justice); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 809.23(2) (\Vest Supp. 1984) (committee
of judges).
98. See Sup. CT. R. REP. Ors. 2(G), discussed infra section V(B)(3).
99. OHIo CONsT. art. IV, § 6.
100. Id. § 3.
101. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2503.05 (Page 1981).
102. The phrase is from ADVISORY CosItrTEE REPORT, supra note 64, at 9.
103. Sup. CT. R. REP. Ors. 2(D)(3).
104. No provision in the rules permits the Reporter to "edit" the opinions of the supreme court. There is. however.
statutory authority for such editing. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2503.22 (Page 1981). See also section IV of this Article
for a discussion of whether the rules supersede contrary statutes, although the question is less important here since the
Reporter serves at the pleasure of the supreme court.
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author of the opinion for approval.10 5 That omission is crucial; the author of an
opinion which will bear his name should have the final say on the content of the
opinion since it is his reputation, after all, which is at stake. 106
The provisions of the rules that give editorial and veto authority to the Reporter
should be deleted. Responsibility for the publication and the content of an opinion
must remain with the judges who wrote it and concurred in it. Deletion of those
provisions would encourage judicial accountability and enhance judicial morale. 0 7
3. Precedent and Citation
a. Precedent: Exposition of the Rules
The most important and controversial issue for a publication plan to address is
the precedential effect of unreported opinions; the question transcends judicial
adminstration and goes to the very heart of the notion of common law adjudication.
Rules 2(G)(1) and 2(G)(2) of the Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions
state the general rule: Opinions published in the Ohio Official Reports 10 8 are
"controlling" authority within the appellate district until reversed or modified; 0 9
unpublished opinions or unofficially published opinions are considered "persuasive"
but not controlling authority." 0
105. Sup. CT. R. REP. Ops. 2(D)(1), in contrast, limits the opinion to twenty-five pages and the Reporter "may
cause" longer opinions "to be reduced in length, subject to the approval of thejudge writing the opinion." We emphasize
that, under the current Reporter, no problems have surfaced.
106. The judges indicate that in practice the Reporter does submit his editing changes for their approval. Further,
the current Reporter indicates that editing is kept to a "bare minimum." See Kobalka, supra note 95, at 8.
107. Other portions of the rules also demean the courts of appeals. The page limitation discussed in the preceding
footnote is an example: it assumes that thejudges of the courts of appeals are not capable of keeping their opinions within
proper lengths. The absence of a comparable provision for the supreme court is telling. Rule 2(D)(1) also directs thejudges
of the courts of appeals to write "in as concise form as may be consistent with a clear presentation. ... Again, that
is a directive that one might expect to be given to college students but not in rules published concerning an appellate court.
Similarly, the requirement in rule 2(D)(2) concerning the cover sheet of the court of appeals opinions is overly
bureaucratic, and it is difficult to see what use it serves. These provisions, along with the ones discussed in the text,
certainly give the reader of the rules the feeling that the supreme court lacks the respect that should be accorded the
intermediate appellate courts.
108. Read literally, an opinion does not have controlling authority until it is published. The rule does not define the
status of an opinion which has been issued but not yet published, instead apparently consigning such opinions to a kind
of legal limbo. Although a hyper-technical trial judge might attempt to escape the controlling effect of an as-yet-to-be-
published opinion of the court of appeals by arguing that it does not bind him until it appears in the Official Reports, the
better practice would seem to be to treat all opinions as controlling authority if the judges have stated that the opinion is
going to be submitted for publication. (In order to facilitate such a practice by otherjudges, the court that issues the opinion
should indicate on the opinion whether it is to be "published".) Even under this procedure, however, problems may arise
if the Reporter fails to publish an opinion submitted to him; what then happens to a decision which has treated the now
only persuasive authority opinion as controlling? Presumably, rules for the reopening of judgments can handle this kind
of problem. This problem, once again, highlights the undesirability of intruding the Reporter into the opinion publication
business.
109. Sup. CT. R. REP Ore. 2(G)(2). Unaccountably, rule 2(G) speaks in terms of "published" and "unpublished"
opinions while the rest of the rules use the words "reported" and "unreported." Very likely the two sets of terms are
meant to be synonymous because the rules do not draw any distinction between "publication" and "reporting."
Nevertheless, the sudden shift in terminology is distracting and potentially confusing. Conceivably, "published" could
be read to mean "made known to the public in any way"; in that case, opinions included in unofficial compilations would
be "published" even though not officially reported. The consistent use of the term "reported" or "officially reported"
in all the rules would eliminate any possibility of confusion.
110. Sup. CT. R. REP. Ops. 2(G)(1). "Controlling authority" typically refers to the way a lower court treats case
law from a higher court in the same jurisdiction; the lower court may distinguish the facts of the case at bar, but it should
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:313
There are two qualifications to this general rule. Rule 2(G)(1) provides that an
unpublished opinion is controlling authority "between the parties . . . when relevant
under the doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata or collateral estoppel or in a
criminal proceeding involving the same defendant." ' I ' Further, unpublished opinions
of one district can be cited by a court of appeals in another district in order to certify
to the supreme court that a conflict exists in the law of two districts.' t 2
b. The Argument for Controlling Precedential Authority.
Notwithstanding these qualifications, the general position of the Supreme Court
Rules for the Publication of Opinions is that unreported opinions should not be
considered controlling precedential authority." t3 Powerful arguments can be mar-
shalled against that position. First, granting full precedential authority to unreported
opinions will flesh out the corpus of law within the district. The average appellate
district in Ohio annually produces about 500 signed and per curiam opinions, but on
the average, only twenty are officially reported.' 14 That is a terribly small figure to
provide answers to recurring questions of law; giving full stare decisis effect to every
opinion would help remedy the problem.
But there are far more important reasons to accord full precedential effect to
unpublished opinions, for doing so enhances judicial responsibility and accountabil-
ity. A fundamental premise of the common law system of adjudication is that judges
are required to decide like cases in like fashion. "5 Without this requirement, which
not question the validity of the authority. "Persuasive authority" by contrast refers to the deference given a decision
because of the force of its reasoning, the quality of its analysis or, sometimes, the prestige of its author. See W. R , NOLDS.
supra note 70, at 107-09.
111. Sup. CT. R. REP. Ops. 2(G)(I). There are problems with the drafting of this exception. The inclusion of the
words "between the parties" seems to limit unduly the application of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
Read literally, it would preclude the use of an unreported opinion in any non-mutual estoppel situation and Would also
prohibit the use of an unreported opinion against a person in privity with a party. These results conflict in part with the
Ohio law of judgments. Ohio has not followed the national trend, see Parklane. Hosiery v. Shore. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
abandoning completely the requirement of mutuality. Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip.. Inc.. 2 Ohio St. 3d 193.
443 N.E.2d 978 (1983); REsTAmTENT (SECOND) OF JuDGMENTs § 29 (1980). Mutuality is still the general rule, but Ohio
courts do seem willing to abandon the doctrine in a particularly compelling case. See Hicks v. De La Cruz. 52 Ohio St.
2d 71,369 N.E.2d 776 (1977). Moreover, Ohio law has long recognized that both resjudicata and collateral estoppel apply
against the privy of a party to the first action. See Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip.. Inc.. 2 Ohio St. 3d 193. 443
N.E.2d 776 (1977); Trautwein v. Sorgenfrei, 58 Ohio St. 2d 493, 391 N.E.2d 226 (1979); 32 0. Jur. 2d Judgnents
§§ 248-72 (1975) (discussing the full range of privity situations recognized by Ohio courts). Thus, to avoid conflict with
the Ohio law on res judicata and collateral estoppel. and to avoid freezing the development of the law. Sup. CT. R. REP.
Ops. 2(G)(1) should be amended by deleting the words "between the parties thereto." Although many other publication
plans have a "res judicata and collateral estoppel" exception none we know of include the "between the parties"
qualification. See ARIZ. R. Cv. App. P. 28(c); ARK. R. Sup. CT. 21(4); IND. R. App. P. 15(A)(3); IowA SUP. CT. R. 10(0);
Wts. Ctv. P. 809.23(3).
112. Sup. CT. R. REP. Ops. 2(G)(3). It is not clear how a "conflict" can arise when one opinion is unpublished and.
therefore, lacks precedential value.
113. For similar rules, see ARIz. R. Ctv. App. P. 28(c); ARK. R. Sup. CT. 21(4); IND. R. App. P. 15(A)(3); IoWA SIP.
CT. R. 10(f); Ky. R. Civ. P. 76.28(4)(c); N.M. Sup. CT. Misc. R. 7(c); WIs. CIv. P. 809.23(3).
114. The average is computed (using the figures for 1982) by dividing the total number of terminations by opinion-
5,940-by the number of districts-12; similarly the average number of published opinions is derived by dividing the
total-244--by 12. See Oto COURTS SUMMARY 12-13 (1982). See note 24. supra. for the statistics for earlier )ears.
115. An early and persistent worry among critics of limited publication/no-citation regimes is that they result in
serious inconsistencies between published and unpublished law. See, e.g.. Gardner. Ninth Circuit's Unpublished
Opinions: Denial of Equal Justice?. 61 A.B.A. J. 1224 (1975). Weisgall, Stop. Search and Seize: The Emerging Doctrine
of Founded Suspicion, 9 U.S.F. L. REv. 219, 253-54 (1974).
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is really the essence of stare decisis, the venal judge would be free to decide cases on
impermissible grounds, such as the sex, race, or political affiliation of the parties.
Usually, good judges, even when unconstrained by the discipline stare decisis
imposes, will avoid such abuses, but the system of precedent is founded upon a
healthy skepticism about power unrestricted by the need for consistency."i 6 The
recognition that a decision will have future implications and will affect the rights of
persons beside the parties to the immediate action helps judges to avoid administering
ad hoc "justice" and encourages them instead to seek equal justice under law as our
system demands.' 7
The no-precedent rule also subverts the judicial responsibility to direct consci-
entious effort to each case to be decided. An important part of that responsibility is
the preparation of an opinion that indicates to the parties and the public the reasons
for the decision." i 8 Recent research on the United States circuit courts suggests that
judges are not spending enough time and effort on their unpublished opinions to
satisfy that requirement. Many unpublished opinions from those courts fail to meet
even the most minimal standards of judicial performance. "19 The quality of opinion-
writing probably would be enhanced if the judges knew that every opinion-reported
or not-would be accorded precedential value. A judge probably will put more effort
into an opinion if she knows that it will have effects beyond the case at bar.
A rule that withholds full precedential effect from unpublished opinions damages
not only judicial responsibility but also judicial accountability. Court of appeals
judges are formally accountable, of course, only to the the Supreme Court of Ohio,
which can reverse or modify their decisions; 20 the no-precedent rules, however,
diminish the likelihood of review. The supreme court, when considering review of an
opinion that probably will not be published is faced simply with a "wrong result" not
with "bad law." The supreme court, therefore, is much less likely to make room on
its discretionary docket to correct an error that will not be perpetuated in future cases.
116. The current Reporter seems to regard the no-precedent rule as providing needed flexibility for the appellate
judges. Kobalka, supra note 95, at 8. It is that very flexibility that the common law system deems so dangerous.
117. Moreover, most judges in our system do not view the system of stare decisis as an external constraint upon their
power rather they have internalized the need for consistency. Thus, judges who sit on courts where unpublished opinions
have no precedential effect nevertheless often index such opinions and consult them out of the desire to remain consistent.
Administrators of two district courts of appeals in Ohio report indexing of unpublished opinion. Letters to William M.
Richman from Richard S. Kasay, Court Administrator, Court of Appeals of Ohio, Ninth Appellate District, and Thomas
J. Rottinghaus. Court Administrator, Court of Appeals of Ohio, First Appellate District. (Copies of these letters are on
file at the offices of the Ohio State Law Journal.) The authors both served as clerks for United States District Judges in
Maryland and read and indexed the unpublished opinions of the district court as well as the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit. See also Testimony of Judge Sprecher of the Seventh Circuit before the Hruska Commission,
Hearings Before the Comm'n on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys., 537-38 (2d Phase 1974-75). Thus it appears
that non-precedent rules are not only ill-advised, but, at least in part, futile. Judges, by force of common law habit, tend
to consult their unpublished opinions regardless of what the rules say.
118. ABA COM'N ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS 58 (1977); P.
CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 34 (1976); K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION
26 (1960).
119. In the 1978-79 reporting year, for example, no discernible justification for a decision could be found in 85%
of the Third Circuit's unpublished opinions, 61% of those from the District of Columbia Circuit, and 59% of those from
the Fifth Circuit. Shockingly, in two of those circuits (the Third and the Fifth), a substantial majority of the unpublished
opinions were shorter than fifty words in length. The Price of Reform. supra note 2, at 599-602.
120. Ono CoNsT. art. IV, § 2(B)(2).
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More subtly, the judges of the courts of appeals are accountable to the trial bench, the
bar, scholars, and the public. No-precedent rules significantly reduce even this sort
of accountability because each of these groups will have less incentive to comment
critically on an opinion that is not "law."
c. Objections and Responses
Commentators have voiced two objections to according full precedential effect
to unpublished opinions, but each of these is subject to a powerful rejoinder. The first
is based on the increased cost in judicial resources. Non-publication, it is argued,
saves the judges time because they do not need to spend as much effort on an opinion
that simply settles the dispute between the parties and neither is widely disseminated
nor becomes an important part of the corpus of the law.' 2' Full discussions of
authority, detailed recitation of the facts, prose-polishing, and proof reading all can
be reduced or eliminated in an opinion that is not written for publication. A rule that
accords full precedential effect, it is argued, eliminates those time savings because a
precedential opinion must be drafted with the sort of care that requires so much
judicial time and effort. 12 2 The short answer to this argument is that the judges must
be able to spend at least the time it takes to explain the result to the parties and the
public in a minimally informative opinion. That is a central part of the notion of
common law adjudication; if the opinion can adequately explain the result, there is no
reason why it should not be precedential. 12 3 If the judges do not have enough time to
perform that crucial function, then Ohio needs more appellate judges or less man-
datory appellate jurisdiction; but both of these questions are for the legislature.
The second objection to full precedential effect for unpublished opinions con-
cerns the access of bench and bar to unpublished opinions. The system of precedent
turns on the ready availability of case law to the consumers of that law. That
availability, in turn, depends upon the wonderful indexing and research tools that
have been developed over the decades of this century by the various law book
publishers, aided in recent years by the advent of computerized research. If a court's
opinions were given full precedential value but could not be retrieved in any easy
fashion, the situation would be intolerable. Thus, the strength of the objection to
giving full precedential value to the unpublished opinions of the courts of appeals
turns on the sophistication and efficiency of the retrieval systems available for those
opinions.
These systems appear to be adequate. First the opinions are available in
micro-fiche from the Law Library Microform Consortium or their agent in Ohio,
121. STANDARDS FOR TIE PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS: A REPORT OF THlE CoMIn'rEE ON USE OF APPELLATE COURT
ENERGIES OFTHE ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR APPELLATE JUSTICE (1973), reprinted in Appellate Justice: 1975. Materials for a
National Conference San Diego, California.
122. Id.; Joiner, Limiting Publication of Judicial Opinions, 56 JUDICATURE 195, 199 (1972).
123. It may be that an adequate opinion in a simple case (or a frivolous appeal) really does little but explain how
routine facts are treated under a settled rule of law. Such an opinion, of course, does not add much to the jurisprudence
of Ohio, but there is no reason to suppress it. It is simply precedent for what it is worth. Along with other such opinions
it may indicate how the court continues to deal with a particular type of recurring problem. Or the fact that the problem
recurs may indicate to the bar, the courts, or the legislature that some change in substantive or procedural law is advisable.
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Banks-Baldwin Law Publishing Company. 2 4 The cost of an annual subscription,
including the unpublished opinions of all appellate districts, an index of criminal cases
and an index of civil cases, is $479.00-a small price considering the economics of
modem law practice.'2 A sophisticated reader/printer to make hard copy from the
microform cards costs over a thousand dollars, but a simple reader is available for
only a few hundred. Further, Banks-Baldwin operates a photocopying service and
delivery system, which will deliver hard copy of any Ohio unpublished opinion
anywhere in the state.' 26 Finally, each of the nine law schools in Ohio and the
majority of county bar libraries subscribe to the full unpublished opinion service from
Banks-Baldwin. Thus the unpublished opinions appear to be widely available to
almost every attorney in Ohio.
Indexing and retrieval of the opinions is slightly more problematic, but still
manageable. Banks-Baldwin publishes one soft-bound index for civil cases and
another for criminal cases. In each series, there are three quarterly issues which are
consolidated with the fourth issue to form a cumulative annual volume; thus far,
however, annual volumes are not consolidated into a cumulative volume covering,
say, five years. The index is not as complex as the West key number sytem, but like
West's, it offers a detailed subject-matter listing as well as a table of laws and rules
construed. The Banks-Baldwin index should be sufficient to perform adequate
research involving Ohio appellate decisions. 2 7
In sum, the arguments in favor of opinions having controlling precedential value,
even if unpublished, are strong. The counter-argument based upon judicial time is
unacceptable. The counter-argument based upon the availability and retrievability of
the opinions has more merit,' 28 but in the end, that argument also must fail. Rule 2(G)
should be amended, therefore, to give each opinion of an Ohio court of appeals
controlling precedential value within that district.
d. Citation
Unlike the rules on precedent, the provisions of the Supreme Court Rules for the
Reporting of Opinions, which govern citation of unpublished opinions are satisfac-
tory. Rule 2(G)(3) provides that a party who cites an unpublished opinion shall attach
124. Telephone conversation between William M. Richman and Enid Zaframn. Vice-President, Editorial Department,
Banks-Baldwin Law Publishing Company.
125. This figure includes the cost for the opinions on microfiche ($300.00) and the civil and criminal indexes
($179.00). For comparison purposes, $479.00 would be exhausted in buying twenty volumes of any national reporter. A
traditional argument in favor of no-citation rules is that permitting citation of unpublished opinions discriminates in favor
of wealthy litigants who can afford to obtain and index such opinions. See, e.g.. United States v. Joly, 493 F.2d 672, 676
(2d Cir. 1974); Jones v. Superintendent, 465 F.2d 1091, 1094 (4th Cir. 1972); see also Non-Precedential Precedent, supra
note 2, at 1187. The extremely reasonable cost of the Banks-Baldwin service minimizes the force of the argument in Ohio.
126. See OHio APPEtATE DEctStoNs INDEX-CIvIL CASES ix (2nd quarter, 1984). The cost is fifty cents per page to
subscribers to the index and one dollar per page to non-subscribers. Banks-Baldwin reports requests for about fifty
opinions per week. Telephone conversation with Enid Zafran, supra note 121.
127. Further, LEXIS soon will have unpublished Ohio appellate decisions added to its library, thus permitting case
retrieval by word-search.
128. One fact that gives a bit more color to this argument is that there is a considerable delay between the time when
an opinion is issued and when it is available from and indexed by Banks-Baldwin. As of January 1, 1985, the most recent
opinions in the University of Toledo Law Library were issued in the second quarter of 1984. The most recent volume of
the index was the volume for the third quarter of 1984.
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a copy of the opinion to his brief and indicate any relevant subsequent history of the
case. 129 This is a sensible restriction that is included in the rules of many of the courts
that permit citation of unpublished opinions. ' 30 It serves as an added convenience for
the opposing party and the court, and the restriction places no serious burden on the
attorney who cites the opinion. The Advisory Committee recommended an additional
and burdensome restriction on the citation of unpublished opinions. The citing
attorney would have to "certify that the cited opinion(s) represents all Ohio unpub-
lished appellate opinions on the point(s) or proposition(s) for which cited that are
known to counsel after diligent search . . . .,131 This requirement is extreme and
trenches significantly upon the adversary system by forcing one party to prepare his
adversary's case as well as his own. ' 32 The supreme court was wise not to adopt it.
VI. CONCLUSION
Limiting the publication of appellate court opinions is a sensitive and risky
project. There are at least promised gains, reduced costs of production and consump-
tion of appellate opinions, but there also are dangers to the integrity of the appellate
process. The best way to maximize the benefits and minimize the risks of limited
publication is to promulgate a rigorous and sophisticated rule to govern the practice.
This rule must give the appellate judges exclusive control over the publication
decision and should guide their decisions with specific criteria designed to minimize
the suppression of valuable legal precedents. Further, the rule should include an
explicit presumption in favor of publication, which would increase the courts of
appeals' excessively low publication rate and thus help "unveil" Ohio's "hidden
courts.' ' 133 Finally, lest the system of stare decisis be seriously undermined, the rule
should accord full precedential value to unpublished opinions and provide for their
responsible citation. The Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions fall far
short of this prescription and should be modified accordingly.
129. Sup. CT. R. REP. Ors. 2(G)(3).
130. STATEMENT OF INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 16;
6TH CIR. R. 24(b); loT CIR. R. 17(c).
131. See ADVISORY CoMMItIrEE REPORT, supra note 64, at 10, Proposed Appellate Rule 25(D), reprinted infra app. B.
132. Cf. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516, (1947) (Jackson, J.. concurring) (giving the same reason for
granting privilege to attorney's "work product").
133. See supra note 24.
[Vol. 46:313
RULES FOR THE REPORTING OF OPINIONS
APPENDIX A
FINAL RULES ADOPTED BY OHIO SUPREME COURT
Effective March 1, 1983
SUPREME COURT RULES FOR THE REPORTING
OF OPINIONS
RULE 1. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
(A) All opinions of the Supreme court shall be reported in the Ohio Official
Reports.
(B) The syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion states the controlling point or points
of law decided in and necessarily arising from the facts of the specific case before the
Court for adjudication.
(C) In a per curiam opinion of the Supreme Court, the point or points of law
decided in the case are contained within the text of each per curiam opinion and are
those necessarily arising from the facts of the specific case before the Court for
adjudication.
RULE 2. COURTS OF APPEALS OPINIONS
(A) No Court of Appeals opinion (which phrase includes per curiam opinion) in
any case shall be reported in the Ohio Official Reports (1) if the Supreme Court has
the case pending for adjudication upon the merits or has ruled upon the merits, unless
the Supreme Court expressly orders such opinion to be reported, (2) if the case is
pending before the Supreme Court on a motion to certify the record or a motion for
leave to appeal, or (3) unless a period of seventy days has expired from the
joumalization of the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
(B) No opinion of a Court of Appeals or parts thereof shall be reported in the
Ohio Official Reports unless (1) it is approved for official reporting by the Supreme
Court Reporter; and (2) the majority of the judges of the Court of Appeals hearing the
case certifies to the Supreme Court Reporter that the opinion meets any one or more
of the standards for reporting specified in Section (E) of this rule.
(C) In addition to or in lieu of the provisions of Section (B)(2) of this rule, a
Court of Appeals may determine by rule that each of its opinions or parts thereof,
excluding orders on procedural matters, orders without opinion, brief memorandum
decisions, and judgment entries under App. R. 11. 1(E), may be sent to the Supreme
Court Reporter for determination whether such opinion shall be reported in the Ohio
Official Reports.
(D)(1) Opinions forwarded to the Supreme Court Reporter by Courts of Appeals
shall be written in as concise form as may be consistent with a clear presentation of
the point or points of law decided in the case and should not normally exceed
twenty-five pages in length. The Supreme Court Reporter may cause opinions which
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have manuscripts greater than twenty-five pages to be reduced in length, subject to
the approval of the judge writing the opinion.
(2) Each opinion forwarded to the Supreme Court Reporter shall have a cover
page indicating thereon the number and style of the case, the character of the
proceeding, (e.g., mandamus, habeas corpus, criminal appeal from common pleas
court, civil appeal from municipal court), the Court of Appeals deciding the case, the
attorneys of the parties, the judgment of the court and the date said judgment was
journalized. (See Form 1.)
(3) The Supreme Court Reporter shall prepare, edit, index, and cause to be
officially reported all Courts of Appeals opinions properly submitted and approved for
reporting in the Ohio Official Reports.
(E) An opinion of a Court of Appeals may be selected for official reporting if it
is determined by the Supreme Court Reporter that the case contributes significantly
to the body of Ohio case law, and that the Court of Appeals which heard the case
certifies that the opinion meets one or more of the following standards for reporting:
(1) It establishes a new rule of law, which term as used in this rule includes
common law, statutory law, procedural rules and administrative rules;
(2) It alters, or modifies, or overrules an existing rule of law;
(3) It applies an established rule of law to facts significantly different from those
in previously published applications;
(4) It explains, criticizes, or reviews the history of an existing rule of law;
(5) It creates or resolves a conflict of authority, or it reverses, overrules, or
otherwise addresses a published opinion of a lower court or administrative
agency;
(6) It concerns or discusses one or more factual or legal issues of significant
public interest;
(7) It concerns a significant legal issue and is accompanied by a concurring or
dissenting opinion;
(8) It concerns a significant legal issue upon the remand of a case from the
United States Supreme Court or the Supreme Court of Ohio.
(F) The syllabus of a Court of Appeals opinion shall not be considered the
controlling statement of either the point or points of law decided, or law of the case,
but rather as a summary for the convenience of the public and the Bar as a research
and indexing aid. In a Court of Appeals opinion, the point or points of law decided
in the case are contained within the text of the opinion, and are those necessarily
arising from the facts of the specific case before the court for adjudication. Opinions
submitted to the Supreme Court Reporter may be submitted with a syllabus approved
by the judge writing the opinion.
(G) Unofficially published opinions and unpublished opinions of the Courts of
Appeals may be cited by any court or person subject to the following restrictions,
limitations, and exceptions:
(1) An unofficially published or unpublished opinion shall not be considered
controlling authority in the judicial district in which it was decided except
between the parties thereto when relevant under the doctrines of the law of
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the case, res judicata or collateral estoppel or in a criminal proceeding
involving the same defendant;
(2) In all other situations, each unofficially published opinion or unpublished
opinion shall be considered persuasive authority on a court, including the
deciding court, in the judicial district in which the opinion was rendered.
Opinions reported in the Ohio Official Reports, however, shall be considered
controlling authority for all purposes in the judicial district in which they
were rendered unless and until each such opinion is reversed or modified by
a court of competent jurisdiction;
(3) A party who cites an unpublished opinion shall attach a copy of the opinion
to his brief or memorandum and indicate any disposition by a superior
appellate court of any appeal therefrom known after diligent search.
(H) Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in Section (G), unofficially
published opinions or unpublished opinions of one appellate district may be cited by
the Court of Appeals of another appellate district for purposes of certifying to the
Supreme Court a conflict question within the provisions of Sections 3(B)(4) and
2(B)(2)(e) of Article IV of the Ohio Constitution.
(I)(1) The acceptance or rejection for reporting of any opinion by the Supreme
Court Reporter shall not be considered a statement of opinion by the Supreme Court
as to the merits of the law stated therein.
(2) The refusal of the Supreme Court to accept any case for review shall not be
considered a statement of opinion by the Supreme court as to the merits of the law
stated within the case.
RULE 3. OPINIONS OF COURTS
INFERIOR TO THE COURTS OF APPEALS
The provisions of Rule 2 shall apply to the opinions of all Ohio courts inferior
to the Courts of Appeals except to the extent that the provisions would by their nature
be clearly inapplicable.
RULE 4. EFFECTIVE DATE
These rules shall be effective and applicable to all cases reported on and after
March 1, 1983.
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APPENDIX B
PROPOSED APPELLATE RULE 25
Proposed in December, 1981, by the Ohio Courts of Appeals Judge's Association
Circulation and Publication of Opinions
(A) STANDARDS OF PUBLICATION. An opinion or decision of a court of
appeals ordinarily should not be published unless it meets one or more of the
following standards, which shall be interpreted so as to publish only
opinions or decisions with precedential value:
(1) It establishes a new rule of law, which term as used in the Rule includes
common law, statutory law, procedural rules and administrative rules;
(2) It alters, or modifies, or overrules an existing rule of law;
(3) It applies an established rule of law to facts significantly different from
those in previously published applications;
(4) It explains, criticizes, or reviews the history of an existing rule of law;
(5) It creates or resolves a conflict of authority or it reverses, overrules, or
otherwise addresses a published opinion of a lower court or adminis-
trative agency;
(6) It concerns or discusses one or more factual or legal issues of significant
public interest;
(7) It concerns a significant legal issue and is accompanied by a concurring
or dissenting opinion;
(8) It concerns a significant legal issue upon the remand of a case from the
United States Supreme Court or the Ohio Supreme Court.
(B) DECISION ON PUBLICATION. No opinion or decision in the court of
appeals shall be reported for publication unless selected or approved for
publication by a majority of the judges participating in the opinion or
decision, in which event it shall be certified to the Reporter of the Supreme
Court for official publication. The Reporter shall determine which opinions
or decisions, or parts thereof, shall be reported for official publication and
the time and means thereof. After an opinion or decision has been certified
to the Reporter for official publication, the opinion or decision, or parts
thereof, may be made available to any other publisher for unofficial
publication.
(C) MOTION FOR PUBLICATION. Any litigant or other person may at any
time file a motion to have any opinion or decision published, stating the
reasons why it meets the standards of publication. Such motion shall be
determined by the judges participating in the opinion or decision in accord-
ance with Section (A) of this Rule.
(D) UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. Unpublished opinions and decisions, includ-
ing judgment entries, may be cited but will not receive recognition unless
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complete copies thereof are attached to the brief or memorandum in which
the citation is made, a full disclosure is made of any disposition by the
Supreme Court of any appeal therefrom that has come to the attention of the
citing attorney, and counsel certifies that the attached copies represent all the
Ohio unpublished appellate opinions and decisions that have come to his or
her attention on the point or proposition with respect to which the citation
is made.
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APPENDIX C
(Editor's Note-The editors and authors would like to thank Chief Justice Frank
Celebrezze for his kind permission in allowing the Ohio State Law Journal to publish
the previously unpublished draft rules and Advisory Committee Report, which appear
in Appendices C and D respectively.)
DRAFT RULES PROPOSED BY OHIO SUPREME COURT
Drafted During Summer Recess of 1982
SUPREME COURT RULES FOR THE PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS
RULE 1. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
(A) All opinions of the Supreme Court shall be published in the Ohio Official
Reports.
(B) The syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion states the law of the case. The
points of law contained in the syllabus of each case shall be confined to the points of
law necessarily arising from the facts of the specific case before the court for
adjudication.
(C) In a per curiam opinion of the Supreme Court, the law of the case is
incorporated within the text of the opinion. The points of law contained in the text of
each per curiam opinion shall be confined to the points of law necessarily arising from
the facts of the specific case before the court for adjudication.
RULE 2. COURTS OF APPEALS OPINIONS
(A) No Court of Appeals opinion in any case shall be published in the Ohio
Official Reports if: (1) the Supreme Court has ruled upon the merits of the case, unless
the Supreme Court expressly orders such opinion to be published; (2) the case is
pending before the Supreme Court for adjudication on the merits; (3) the case is
pending before the Supreme Court on a motion to certify the record or a motion for
leave to appeal; or (4) a period of seventy days has not yet expired from the
journalization of the judtment [sic] of the Court of Appeals.
(B) No opinion of a Court of Appeals shall be published in the Ohio Official
Reports unless (1) it is approved for publication by the Supreme Court Reporter; and
(2) the majority of the judges of the Court of Appeals hearing the case certifies to the
Supreme Court Reporter that the opinion meets the standards for publication specified
in Section (E) of this Rule.
(C) In addition to or in lieu of the provisions of Section (B)(2) of this Rule, a
Court of Appeals may determine by rule that each of its decisions, excluding orders
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on procedural matters, orders without opinion, and brief memorandum decisions,
may be sent to the Supreme Court Reporter for determination whether such opinion
shall be published in the Ohio Official Reports.
(D)(1) Opinions forwarded to the Supreme Court Reporter by Courts of Appeals
shall be written in as concise form as may be consistent with a clear persentation [sic]
of the law of the case. The Supreme Court Reporter may cause opinions which have
manuscripts greater than twenty-five pages to be reduced in length;
(2) Each opinion forwarded to the Supreme Court Reporter shall have a cover
page indicating thereon the number and style of the case, the character of the
proceeding, the Court of Appeals deciding the case, the attorneys of the parties, the
judgment of the court and the date said judgment was journalized;
(3) The Supreme Court Reporter shall prepare, edit, index, and cause to be
published all Courts of Appeals opinions property [sic] submitted and approved for
publication.
(E) An opinion of a Court of Appeals may be selected for publication if it is
determined by the Supreme Court Reporter that the case contributes significantly to
the body of Ohio case law, and that the Court of Appeals which heard the case
certifies that the opinion meets one or more of the following standards for publi-
cation:
(I) It establishes a new rule of law, which term as used in this Rule includes
common law, statutory law, procedural rules and administrative rules;
(2) It alters, or modifies, or overrules an existing rule of law;
(3) It applies an established rule of law to facts significantly different from those
in previously published applications;
(4) It explains, criticizes, or reviews the history of an existing rule of law;
(5) It creates or resolves a conflict of authority, or it reverses, overrules, or
otherwise addresses a published opinion of a lower court or administrative
agency;
(6) It concerns or discusses one or more factual or legal issues of significant
public interest;
(7) It concerns a significant legal issue and is accompanied by a concurring or
dissenting opinion;
(8) It concerns a significant legal issue upon the remand of a case from the
United State Supreme Court or the Ohio Supreme Court.
(F) The syllabus of a Court of Appeals opinion shall not be considered the law
of the case. The syllabus shall be considered solely as headnotes for the convenience
of the public and the Bar as a research and indexing aid. In a Court of Appeals
opinion, the law of the case is incorporated within the body of the opinion. The law
of the case shall be confined to the points of law necessarily arising from the facts of
the specific case before the Court of Appeals for adjudication. Opinions submitted to
the Supreme Court Reporter may be submitted with a syllabus approved by the judges
of the Court of Appeals which heard the case.
(G) Unofficially published opinions and unpublished opinions of the Courts of
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Appeals may be cited by any court or person subject to the following restrictions,
limitations, and exceptions:
(1) An unofficially published or unpublished opinion shall not be considered
controlling authority in the judicial district in which it was decided except between the
parties thereto when relevant under the doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata,
or collateral estoppel, or in a criminal proceeding involving the same defendant;
(2) In all other situations, each unofficially published opinion or unpublished
opinion shall be considered merely persuasive authority on a court, including the
deciding court, in the judicial district in which the opinion was rendered. Opinions
published in the Ohio Official Reports, however, shall be considered controlling
authority for all purposes in the judicial district in which they were rendered unless
and until each such opinion is reversed or modified by a court of competent
jurisdiction to do so;
(3) A party who cites an unpublished opinion shall attach a copy of the opinion
to his brief or memorandum and indicate any disposition by a superior appellate court
of any appeal therefrom known after diligent search.
(H) Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in Section (G), unofficially
published opinions or unpublished opinions of one appellate district may be cited by
the Court of Appeals of another appellate district for purposes of certifying to the
Supreme Court a conflict question within the provisions of Sections 3(B)(4) and
2(B)(2)(e) of Article IV of the Ohio Constitution.
(I)(1) The acceptance or rejection for publication of any opinion by the Supreme
Court Reporter shall not be considered a statement of opinion by the Supreme Court
as to the merits of the law stated therein.
(2) The refusal of the Supreme Court to accept any case for review shall not be
considered a statement of opinion by the Supreme Court as to the merits of the law
stated within the case.
(J) This Rule shall be effective and applicable to all cases decided on and after
RULE 3. OPINIONS OF COURTS
INFERIOR TO THE COURTS OF APPEALS
The provisions of Rule 2 shall apply to the opinions of all Ohio courts inferior
to the Courts of Appeals except to the extent that the provisions would by their nature
be clearly inapplicable.
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APPENDIX D
THE SUPREME COURT RULES FOR THE PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS




CONFLICTS WITH R.C. 2503.20
The Supreme Court Rules for the Publication of Opinions (herein, "Rules")
confirm in part and change in part the existing publication practice. The specific
changes will be noted in our Specific Comments about each Section, but the
Committee has an abiding concern that is common to all these changes. This is that
they conflict with the provisions of R.C. 2503.20 (Appendix A). For one instance,
the statute provides that the courts of appeals decide what shall be published, whereas
the Rules repose the ultimate decision about publication in the Supreme Court
Reporter (shortened to "Reporter"). The Rules are not currently proposed for
adoption as rules of practice and procedure, the adoption of which under Section 5(B)
of Article IV of the Constitution will render all laws in conflict with them of no further
force or effect. The Rules are drafted as a new and separate category of Supreme
Court rule, and this form will not resolve the question whether the Rules will prevail
over the statute, or vice versa. The statute might be repealed, but we recommend that
it be conclusively superseded by adoption of the Rules as rules of practice and
procedure under the constitutional provision.
Section 3(C) of Article IV of the Constitution states in full: "Laws may be
passed providing for the reporting of cases in the courts of appeals." This provision
is permissive in character, but it could be construed to mean that publication
provisions may be adopted only by statutory enactment. The use of the constitutional
procedure in Section 5(B) of Article IV of the Constitution for the adoption of rules
of practice and procedure will remove any question, we believe. Because the Rules
govern the status and citation of unpublished opinions and the procedures for the
reporting of cases in the Official Reports, we believe they are rules of practice and
procedure.
We note the difference between "report" and "publish." An opinion may be
"published" by being included in an appellate district's distribution of opinions, a
microfiche collection, a computer data base or an unofficial publication, as well as
being "reported" in the Ohio Official Reports. We have attempted to keep this
distinction in mind.
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VOTE OF THE COMMITTEE
The Committee's recommendations are unanimous except where otherwise
indicated at the conclusion of the Specific Comments on each Section.
FORMAT
On the following pages you will find our Specific Comments on each Section of
the Rules, illustrated by a copy of each Section changed as recommended by the
Committee.
Appendix B, the last item in this Report and Recommendations, brings all
recommended changes together in one document.
SPECIFIC COMMENTS
RULE I(A)
(Editor's Note-Throughout this Report, italicized materials are those deleted by
the committee; and capitalized materials are those added by the committee. This slight
deviation from the original report was necessitated by printing capabilities.)
(A) All opinions of the Supreme Court shall be published in the Ohio Official Reports.
THE DECISIONS IN ALL CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT SHALL BE RE-
PORTED IN THE OHIO OFFICIAL REPORTS, TOGETHER WITH THE REASONS
THEREFOR.
We recommend that Rule 1(A) use the language of Section 2(C) of Article IV
of the Constitution, with the addition of the phrase "in the Ohio Official Reports."
RULE 1(B)
(B) The syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion states the law of the case. The points of law
contained in the syllabus of each case shall be confined to the points of law POINT OR
POINTS OF LAW necessarily arising from the facts of the specific case before the court
for adjudication.
We recommend that the phrase "the law of the case" should not be used in the
Rules because it is a phrase of art with a specific meaning. It stands for the proposition
that an adjudication by an appellate court becomes the law of that particular case in
all subsequent proceedings; its applicability is limited to a single case. Barney v.
Winona & St. Peter R.R. (1886), 117 U.S. 228; Gohman v. City of St. Bernard
(1924), 111 Ohio St. 726; 5 Ohio Jur. 3d Appellate Review sec. 648, sec. 718 (1978);
Note, "Modifications of the Doctrine of the Law of the Case," 11 U. Cin. L. Rev.
266 (1937). The doctrine of res judicata applies to subsequent but different suits
between the same parties or their privies, the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies
to different suits with a common party, and the doctrine of stare decisis applies to
different suits between entirely different parties. We recommend that the Rules use
the phrase "the point or points of law."
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The second sentence of Rule I(B) reads more like a direction to the Justices of
the Supreme Court rather than an explanation for the bench and bar. Our recommen-
dation is designed to cure any possible misunderstanding.
RULE I(C)
(C) In a per curiam opinion of the Supreme Court, the law of POINT OR POINTS OF
LAW DECIDED IN the case is incorporated within the text of the opinion. The points of
law ARE contained in the text of each per curiam opinion shall be confined to the points
of law AND ARE THOSE necessarily arising from the facts of the specific case before the
court for adjudication.
We recommend equivalent changes in Rule I(C): delete the phrase "law of the
case" in the first sentence, and combine the two sentences as recommended above for
Section (B).
RULE 2(A)
(A) No Court of Appeals opinion (WHICH PHRASE INCLUDES PER CURIAM
DECISION) in any case shall be published REPORTED in the Ohio Official Reports if.
(1) IF the Supreme Court HAS THE CASE PENDING FOR ADJUDICATION ON THE
MERITS OR has ruled upon the merits of the case, unless the Supreme Court expressly
orders such opinion to be published; (2) IF the case is pending before the Supreme Court
for adjudication on the merits; (3) the case is pending before the Supreme Court on a
motion to certify the record or a motion for leave to appeal; or (4) (3) UNLESS a period
of seventy THIRTY days has not yet expired from the joumalization of the judgment of
the court of appeals. , AND THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS CERTIFIED TO THE
REPORTER THAT NO NOTICE OF APPEAL, NO MOTION TO CERTIFY THE
RECORD, NO MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AND NO CERTIFICATION OF
CONFLICT HAS BEEN FILED.
We recommend that clauses (1), (2), (3) and (4) may advantageously be
reworded and renumbered so that the prohibition against publication includes the time
while the case is pending for any reason before the Supreme Court as well as the
thirty-day period during which attempts can be made to bring the case to the Supreme
Court.
RULE 2(B) AND (C)
(B) No opinion of a Court of Appeals OR PARTS THEREOF shall be published
REPORTED in the Ohio Official Reports unless (I) it is approved for publication
OFFICIAL REPORTING by the Supreme Court Reporter; and (2) the OR A majority of
the judges of the Court of Appeals hearing the case, certifies to the Supreme Court
Reporter PROVIDED that the opinion meets ANY ONE OR MORE OF the standards for
publication specified in Section (E) of this Rule. ANY LITIGANT OR OTHER PERSON
MAY AT ANY TIME FILE A MOTION TO HAVE AN OPINION OR PART THEREOF
OFFICIALLY REPORTED, STATING THE REASONS WHY IT MEETS THE
STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, WHICH MOTION SHALL BE RULED ON BY
THE JUDGES HEARING THE CASE IN CONSULTATION WITH THE SUPREME
COURT REPORTER. OPINIONS NOT OFFICIALLY REPORTED MAY BE SUB-
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MITRED TO PUBLISHERS AND DISSEMINATORS OTHER THAN THE SUPREME
COURT REPORTER EXCEPT AS PROVIDED IN SECTION (A) OF THIS RULE.(C)
In addition to or in lieu of the provisions of Section (B)(2) of this Rule, a Court of Appeals
may determine by rule that each of its decisions OPINIONS OR PARTS THEREOF,
excluding orders on procedural matters, orders without opinion, and brief memorandum
decisions, AND JUDGMENT ENTRIES UNDER APP. R. 11. 1(E), may be sent to the
Supreme Court Reporter for determination whether such opinion shall be published
REPORTED in the Ohio Official Reports.
We note that these two sections introduce changes from R.C. 2503.20. That
statute provides that the ultimate decision about official reporting lies with the judges
of the Court of Appeals. We recommend that Section (B) be changed so that inclusion
in the Official Reports can be ordered by either the Reporter or a majority of the
judges hearing the case, provided that the opinion meets any one or more of the
standards for publication in Section (E). In connection with this recommendation we
also recommend that Section (D)(1) be changed so that it is consistent with these
recommended changes to Section (B).
We make this recommendation because we believe the ultimate decision about
what is published should be made by the judges whose duty it is not only to decide
the case stating their reasons but also to make significant judgments of precedential
value known throughout their judicial district.
We find no other publication plan among the federal or state courts of appeals
that takes the decision about publication away from the judiciary and places it in an
appointed administrative officer, however respected the office or responsible the
incumbent. We suggest that excessive length of opinions and unnecessary publication
will be controlled by the combined good sense and good will of the appellate judges
and the Reporter working together.
We recommend that Sections (B) and (C) of Rule 2 refer to "opinions or parts
thereof" because in certain cases, some rulings on assignment of error may not meet
the standards for publication and can be omitted without changing the sense and
meaning of the precedential points of law decided in the case.
We recommend that a provision be added to Section (B) permitting any litigant
or other person to file a motion to have any opinion or part thereof reported officially,
stating the reasons why it meets the standards for publication, the ultimate decision
about publication remaining with the judges hearing the case in consultation with the
Reporter. Two federal circuits and two states have these provisions, which tend to
meet the criticism against the limitations of publication to the effect that precedent
might be suppressed by nonpublication of significant opinions.
We recommend that a provision be added to Section (B) for the submission of
cases not officially reported to publishers and disseminators other than the Reporter.
In any and all events, we recommend that Section (B) and (C) provide that the
ultimate decision about publication, by whomsoever made, must be made by applying
the standards for publication.
Judge Stephenson and Messrs. Fitzsimmons and Manos disagree with the
foregoing, believing that Sections (B) and (C) should remain as originally written.
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Judge Stephenson does not want the Reporter empowered to report cases not approved
for reporting by the court.
RULE 2(D)(1)
(D)(l) Opinions forwarded to the Supreme Court Reporter by Courts of Appeals shall be
written in as concise form as may be consistent with a clear presentation of the law of the
case POINT OR POINTS OF LAW DECIDED IN THE CASE AND SHOULD NOT
NORMALLY EXCEED TWENTY-FIVE PAGES IN LENGTH. IF THE The Supreme
Court Reporter may cause opinions which have manuscripts greater than twenty-five
pages to be reduced in length; ADVISES THE JUDGES DECIDING THE CASE THAT
ANY OPINION SHOULD NOT BE OFFICIALLY REPORTED OR SHOULD BE
CHANGED OR REDUCED, THE JUDGES SHALL GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERA-
TION TO HIS ADVICE.
We recommend that in the first sentence the phrase "the law of the case" be
changed to "the point or points of law decided in the case." See recommendation re
Rule I(B).
We recommend that the second sentence, which now conflicts with R.C.
2503.20, be changed to provide that if the Reporter advises the judges that any
opinion should not be officially reported for any reason or should be changed or
reduced, the judges shall listen carefully.
Opinions should be concise, in the first instance, but we know of no judge who
is willing to surrender and turn over to another party the crucial task of reducing the
length of an opinion discussing complex issues and doctrines.
RULE 2(D)(2)
(2) Each opinion forwarded to the Supreme Court Reporter shall have a cover page
indicating thereon the number and style of the case, the character of the proceeding, (E.G.,
MANDAMUS, HABEAS CORPUS, CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS,
CIVIL APPEAL FROM MUNICIPAL COURT), the Court of Appeals deciding the case,
the attorneys of the parties, the judgment of the court and the date said judgment was
joumalized. (SEE FORM 1.)
We suggest that the meaning of "the character of the proceeding" needs
clarification, and we assume that the phrase refers to the classification of cases in the
way cases are classified for the quarterly status reports filed by the Courts of Appeals.
We suggest the requirement of a cover page will be better understood if an
official form is attached to the rule. We have drafted an example, attached as Form
I to Appendix B.
RULE 2(D)(3)
(3) The Supreme Court Reporter MAY SUGGEST EDITING CHANGES TO THE
JUDGES HEARING THE CASE AND shall prepare, edit, index, and cause to be
published OFFICIALLY REPORTED all Courts of Appeals opinions properly submitted
and approved for publication. THE OHIO OFFICIAL REPORTS.
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While this section follows a similar sentence in R.C. 2503.20, we suggest that
it be changed to complement the changes in Rule 2(D)(1) and to leave ultimate
decisions about the editing changes to the judges hearing the case.
RULE 2(E)
(E) An opinion of a Court of Appeal may be selected for publication OFFICIAL
REPORTING if it is determined by the Supreme Court Reporter that the case contributes
significantly to the body of Ohio case law, and that the Court of Appeals which heard the
case certifies that the opinion meets one or more of the following standards for publica-
tion:
(1) It establishes a new rule of law, which term as used in this Rule includes common
law, statutory law, procedural rules and administrative rules;
(2) It alters, or modifies, or overrules an existing rule of law;
(3) It applies an established rule of law to facts significantly different from those in
previously published applications;
(4) It explains, criticizes, or reviews the history of an existing rule of law;
(5) It creates or resolves a conflict of authority, or it reverses, overrules, or otherwise
addresses a published opinion of a lower court or administrative agency;
(6) It concerns or discusses one or more factual or legal issues of significant public
interest;
(7) It concerns a significant legal issue and is accompanied by a concurring or
dissenting opinion;
(8) It concerns a significant legal issue upon the remand of a case from the United States
Supreme Court or the Ohio Supreme Court.
Because Rules 2(B) and (C) set forth who makes the decision about inclusion in
the Official Reports, we recommend that parts of the opening paragraph be deleted.
In any and all events, we strongly recommend that the third line must be deleted
because it adds another standard of publication that may be interpreted differently than
those set forth in Subsection (1) through (8) of Rule 2(E). We interpret those eight
Subsections as being an explicit elaboration of what is meant by the phrase "con-
tributes significantly to the body of Ohio case law."
RULE 2(F)
(F) The syllabus HEADNOTE of a Court of Appeals opinion shall not be considered THE
CONTROLLING STATEMENT OF EITHER THE POINT OF POINTS OF LAW
DECIDED OR the law of the case., BUT RATHER A SUMMARY The syllabus shall be
considered solely as headnotes for the convenience of the public and the bar as a research
and indexing aid. In a Court ofAppeals opinion, the law of the case is incorporated within
the body of the opinion. The law of the case of the specific case before the Court ofAppeals
for adjudication. Opinions submitted to the Supreme Court Reporter may be submitted
with a syllabus approved by the judges of the Court of Appeals which heard the case.
We believe that while the first two sentences of Rule 2(F) are significant, the
balance is not. We recommend that these two sentences be combined as noted. We
have changed "syllabus" to "headnote" with respect to Courts of Appeals opinions,
because a headnote does not authoritatively state the points of law decided in the case,
as does a Supreme Court syllabus.
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RULE 2(G)
(G) Unofficiatlly published opinions and unpublished opinions of the Court ofAppeals may
be cited by any court or person subject to the following restrictions, limitations, and
exceptions:
(I) An unofficially published or unpublished opinion shall not be considered controlling
authority in the judicial district in which it was decided except between the parties thereto
when relevant under the doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata or collateral estoppel
or in a criminal proceeding involving the same defendant;
(2) In all other situations, each unofficially published opinion or unpublished opinion shall
be considered merely persuasive authority on a court, including the deciding court, in the
judicial district in which the opinion was rendered. Opinions published in the Ohio
Official Reports, however, shall be considered controlling authority for all purposes in the
judicial district in which they were rendered unless and until each such opinion is reversed
or modified by a court of competent jurisdiction to do so;
(3) A party who cites an unpublished opinion shall attach a copy of the opinion to his brief
or memorandum and indicate any disposition by a superior appellate court of any appeal
therefrom known after diligent search.
(G) ALL OPINIONS OF THE COURTS OF APPEALS SHALL BE CONTROLLING
AUTHORITY IN THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN WHICH FILED, UNLESS AND
UNTIL REVERSED, OVERRULED OR MODIFIED BY A COURT OF COMPETENT
JURISDICTION TO DO SO. COUNSEL CITING AN OPINION NOT REPORTED IN
THE OHIO OFFICIAL REPORTS SHALL ATTACH A COMPLETE COPY TO THE
BRIEF" OR MEMORAN-DUM IN WHICH THE CITATION IS MADE AND SHALL
CERTIFY THAT THE CITED OPINION(S) REPRESENTS ALL OHIO OPINIONS
NOT OFFICIALLY REPORTED ON THE POINT(S) FOR WHICH CITED THAT ARE
KNOWN TO COUNSEL AFTER DILIGENT SEARCH, AND THE DISCLOSURE OF
ANY DISPOSITIONS OF ANY APPEAL BY A SUPERIOR APPELLATE COURT
THAT ARE KNOWN TO COUNSEL AFTER DILIGENT SEARCH. (SEE FORM 2)
Section (G) is, in large part, a significant change from established law and from
the provisions of R.C. 2503.20. We strongly recommend major changes, because we
believe the reasons for the changes are overwhelming.
If Section (B), (E) and (G) of Rule 2 remain as drafted, then the Reporter
becomes the final arbiter of what law shall be controlling authority in each of the
appellate districts. The judges of the Courts of Appeals have no say about controlling
authority either by way of initial decision to report officially, or by appeal from the
Reporter's decision. With respect to unpublished and unofficially published opinions,
the Courts of Appeals would become ad hoc administrative agencies without any need
to be consistent from case to case in the application or declaration of the law of Ohio.
These are undesirable results. For the sake of stability, a court of appeals must apply
the law consistently in its jurisdiction and must follow the first decision made on any
point of law by any panel in the appellate district, assuming the decision is consistent
with the law as laid down by higher authority. The doctrine of stare decisis is that each
court decision entering a new area is precedent for the future and must be the guiding
principle until modified or overruled in the orderly course of the evolution of the law.
Finally, even though an opinion is not officially reported, it will be available in
formats other than printed copy, such as sets of opinions disseminated in the appellate
districts, microfiche or computer data base. Inconsistencies can not be buried.
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Further, the citation of opinions not reported in the Ohio Official Reports should
be conditioned on the attachment of (1) a copy to the brief or memorandum in which
cited and (2) a certificate by the citing attorney that states that the cited opinion(s)
represents all Ohio opinions not officially reported on the point(s) for which cited that
are known to him after diligent search, and that discloses any disposition of any
appeal by a superior appellate court known after diligent search. We suggest a form
for the certificate as Form 2 in our Appendix B.
RULE 2(H)
(H) Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in Section (G), unofficially published
opinions or unpublished opinions of one appellate district may be cited by tile Court of
Appeals of another appellate district for purposes of certifying to the Supreme Court a
conflict question within the provisions of Sections 3(B)(4) and 2(B)(2)(e) of Article IV of
the Ohio Constitution.
We suggest that this Section should be deleted, because the provisions of
Sections 3(B)(4) and 2(B)(2)(e) of Article IV of the Constitution are largely self-ex-
ecuting, and because the entire subject is covered by Supreme Court Rule of Practice
III and by R.C. 2505.072.
RULE 2(I)(1) AND (2)
(I)(1) The acceptance or rejection for reporting of any opinion by the Supreme Court
Reporter shall not be considered a statement of opinion by the Supreme Court as to the
merits of the law stated therein.
(2) The refusal of the Supreme Court to accept any case for review shall not be considered
a statement of opinion by the Supreme Court as to the merits of the law stated within the
case.
We believe that Section I contains useful statements. In particular, Subsection (2) will
counter the perennial fallacy used by counsel, in an attempt to upgrade a lower court's
decision that was not accepted by the Supreme Court for review.
If Section (H) is deleted, Section (I) must be relettered to (H).
RULE 2(J)
(J) This Rule THESE RULES shall be effective and applicable to all cases decided on and
after
We recommend that the provisions about effective date should apply to all three
Rules and therefore should be placed after Rule 3.
We recommend the deletion of the words "and applicable to all cases decided"
because this phrase suggests (1) that there are no standards for publication of opinions
made before the effective date that may be considered for official reporting after-
wards, and (2) that only unpublished opinions rendered after the the [sic] effective
date may be cited, contrary to present practice.
[Vol. 46:313
RULES FOR THE REPORTING OF OPINIONS
RULE 3
RULE 3. OPINIONS OF COURTS INFERIOR TO THE COURTS OF APPEALS
The provisions of Rule 2 shall apply to the opinions of all Ohio courts inferior to the
Courts of Appeals except to the extent that the provisions would by their nature be clearly
inapplicable.
(A) NO OPINION OF A COURT INFERIOR TO THE COURTS OF APPEALS SHALL
BE REPORTED IN THE OHIO OFFICIAL REPORTS IF (I) THE SUPREME COURT
HAS THE CASE PENDING FOR ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OR HAS
RULED UPON THE MERITS, UNLESS THE SUPREME COURT EXPRESSLY OR-
DERS SUCH OPINION TO BE PUBLISHED. (2) IF A CASE IS PENDING BEFORE
THE SUPREME COURT ON A MOTION TO CERTIFY THE RECORD OR A
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL.
(B) NO OPINION OF A COURT INFERIOR TO THE COURTS OF APPEALS SHALL
BE REPORTED IN THE OHIO OFFICIAL REPORTS UNLESS (1)IT MEETS ANY
ONE OR MORE OF THE STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION SPECIFIED IN RULE
2(E), AND (2) IT IS APPROVED FOR OFFICIAL REPORTING BY SUPREME
COURT REPORTER. THE WRITING JUDGE, ANY LITIGANT OR ANY OTHER
PERSON-MAY AT ANY TIME SUGGEST IN WRITING TO THE SUPREME COURT
REPORTER THAT AN OPINION OR PART THEREOF SHOULD5 BE OFFICIALLY
REPORTED, STATING THE REASONS WHY IT MEETS THE STANDARDS FOR
PUBLICATION.
(C) OPINIONS OF THE INFERIOR COURT FORWARDED TO THE SUPREME
COURT REPORTER SHALL BE WRITTEN IN AS CONCISE FORM AS-MAY BE
CONSISTENT WITH A CLEAR PRESENTATION OF THE POINT OR POINTS OF
LAW DECIDED IN THE CASE AND SHOULD NOT NORMALLY EXCEED TWEN-
TY-FIVE PAGES. THE SUPREME COURT REPORTER MAY SUGGEST EDITING
CHANGES TO THE WRITING JUDGE. WHEN THE OPINION IS APPROVED FOR
OFFICIAL REPORTING, THE SUPREME COURT REPORTER SHALL PREPARE,
INDEX AND CAUSE IT TO BE-INCLUDED IN THE OHIO OFFICIAL REPORTS.
(D) EACH OPINION OF THE INFERIOR COURTS FORW-ARDED TO THE SU-
PREME COURT REPORTER SHALL HAVE A COVER PAGE INDICATING
THEREON THE NUMBER AND STYLE OF THE CASE, THE CHARACTER OF THE
PROCEEDING, (E.G., MANDAMUS, HABEAS CORPUS, CRIMINAL ACTION,
CIVIL ACTION), THE COURT DECIDING THE CASE, THE ATTORNEYS OF THE
PARTIES, THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT AND THE DATE THE JUDGMENT
ENTRY WAS JOURNALIZED.
(E) THE HEADNOTE OF AN INFERIOR COURT'S OPINION SHALL NOT BE
CONSIDERED THE CONTROLLING STATEMENT OF EITHER THE POINT OR
POINTS OF LAW DECIDED OR THE LAW OF THE CASE, BUT RATHER A
SUMMARY FOR THE CONVENIENCE OF THE PUBLIC AND THE BAR AS A
RESEARCH AND INDEXING AID.
The Courts inferior to the Courts of Appeals are under no duty to write opinions,
but it may be advisable for them to do so in certain cases. When they do, the opinion
has an obviously limited authority even within the jurisdiction of the writing court.
Nevertheless, there are a certain number of instances when the publication of a lower
court's opinion has value and will be persuasive authority within and without its
jurisdiction; for instance, when the opinion interprets a new law or a local rule or
makes a factual determination that may later call for the application of the doctrine
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of collateral estoppel. Publication will be advantageous in such instances for both
bench and bar. At the same time, the decision to publish should be made from as
broad a view as possible.
We recommend that Rule 3 be explicit and that it give to the Reporter the
decision whether or not to include opinions of the lower courts in the official reports,
either on his own initiative, or on suggestion of the lower court, any litigant or any
other person, provided always that the opinion meets any one or more of the standards
for publication. This recommendation changes the provisions of R.C. 2503.20 by
adding the standards of publication.
Respectfully submitted for the Committee,
Robert L. Black, Jr., Chairman
Honorable Jack G. Day
Honorable Robert H. Gorman
Honorable James A. Brogan
Honorable Frank G. O'Bell
Honorable Joseph Donofrio
Honorable Earl E. Stephenson








Coit H. Gilbert, Secretary
(Editor's Note-Two appendices to the report have been deleted. The appendi-
ces contained Ohio Revised Code section 2503.20 and the Supreme Court Rules for
the Reporting of Opinions.)
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